**Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)**

**Redacted pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 2617 (2021)**

# Report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on its comprehensive visit to Hungary *(16–18 June 2025)*

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## Executive summary

Pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) conducted a comprehensive visit on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, to Hungary from 16 to 18 June 2025, to monitor and promote its implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017), 2617 (2021), and other relevant Council resolutions. The visiting delegation also included experts from United Nations bodies and the following international and regional organizations: the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Customs Organization, and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation. The visits are conducted with the consent of the host State and in accordance with the Committee's framework document for visits to Member States.

Hungary has made considerable efforts to comply with the requirements of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017). Certain areas, however, require further action in order for Hungary to achieve full and effective compliance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions.

**Counter-terrorism legislation and judicial practice.** Hungary has taken a number of measures to strengthen its criminal law framework pertaining to terrorism. The Committee encourages Hungary to continue building the capacity of the judiciary and investigative authorities to investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases, notably with regard to the use of digital evidence to secure the prosecution of terrorist activities.

**Countering the financing of terrorism.** Hungary has significantly amended and strengthened its anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism legislative, regulatory and supervisory framework. Hungary took various actions to enhance cooperation and coordination on policymaking and operational levels. Hungary amended its Criminal Code with effect from January 2018, including two categories of terrorism-financing offences under sections 318 and 318/A(1). The newly introduced section 318/A(1) criminalizes terrorism financing without requiring any specific purposive element. Hungary utilizes European Union mechanisms to order the freezing of terrorist assets but needs to create its own domestic mechanism.

**Law enforcement.** Law enforcement in Hungary is intelligence-led, operational and has established inter-agency cooperation and collection and exploitation of information capabilities on terrorism and organized crime, mainly under the Counter-Terrorism Centre and the National Information Centre. The law enforcement bodies are equipped to conduct terrorism- and organized crime-related investigations, including online, and to obtain and preserve digital evidence. Hungary is encouraged to ensure that comprehensive national-level risk management and its results are communicated and disseminated to all relevant authorities and to continue efforts to ensure that terrorism-related information is disseminated in a timely and systematic manner to all relevant authorities with mandates and tasks in implementing counter-terrorism-related measures

**Border management.** Hungary has made significant investments in border management aimed at strengthening migration governance and preventing illegal border crossings. Hungary has established a passenger information unit, located in the National Information Centre. Hungary is encouraged to further enhance its capability regarding passenger data systems, by providing direct access to advance passenger information and passenger name record data to border control authorities and other relevant national authorities responsible for countering terrorism and organized crime, to detect at the earliest possible stage the movement of terrorists, foreign terrorist fighters, serious criminals, and commodities that could be used for terrorist or criminal purposes.

**Aviation security.** Hungary has taken a number of steps to strengthen aviation security, including both landside and airside security measures. Hungary's primary aviation security legislation is governed by Government Decree 169/2010. Hungary has developed the National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme and the National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme and has established the National Civil Aviation Security Committee.

**National integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.** Hungary has not yet adopted a national comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategy. The Committee encourages Hungary to consider developing a counter-terrorism strategy that is comprehensive and integrated, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013), 2395 (2017) and 2617 (2021), and relevant international good practices.

**Countering incitement and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.** Hungary has not yet adopted a strategy on countering violent extremism. However, Hungary implements programmes promoting tolerance, dialogue, and human rights education and supports efforts that contribute indirectly to preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism, such as the current development of a new national youth strategy. In December 2023, Hungary adopted legislation to implement the European Union Digital Services Act. Hungary is encouraged to ensure continued monitoring and appropriate responses to the threat posed by terrorism on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion and belief, while respecting freedom of expression and association.

**Human rights in the context of countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.** Throughout the visit, the delegation reiterated the position of the Security Council that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law. In this regard, the delegation raised concerns expressed by United Nations human rights mechanisms, including with respect to asylum-seekers, migration procedures and the role of civil society. The delegation encouraged Hungary to continue its dialogue with the relevant mechanisms and to keep the Counter-Terrorism Committee informed accordingly.

# I. Introduction

1. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), acting on behalf of the Counter-Terrorism Committee, conducted a comprehensive visit to Hungary from 16 to 18 June 2025. The visit focused on measures introduced by Hungary to implement Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014), 2396 (2017), 2617 (2021), and other relevant Council resolutions. It was conducted in accordance with the Committee's framework document for visits.

2. The topics addressed by the delegation included the level and nature of the terrorist threat facing Hungary, as well as the measures Hungary had introduced in response in the areas of legal and criminal justice; international legal cooperation; countering the financing of terrorism (CFT); countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism; and comprehensive national counter-terrorism strategies. The delegation also enquired into the human rights aspects of Hungary's counter-terrorism measures, as well as Hungary's incorporation of gender considerations and the multiple roles of women in terrorism and counter-terrorism, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2242 (2015).

3. The delegation was led by Assistant Secretary-General Natalia Gherman, Executive Director of CTED, and consisted of CTED experts, as well as experts from the following United Nations bodies and international and regional organizations: the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT); the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the World Customs Organization (WCO); and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol).

4. The Executive Director held bilateral meetings with high-level officials from key offices working on counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Interior, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade/State Secretary for Security Policy and Energy Security, the Prosecutor General, the Commissioner for the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing/State Secretary for financial regulation and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary. The Executive Director also visited the Counter Terrorism Centre (TEK), where she met with the Director General, the Victim Support Centre, and the UNOCT Office in Budapest.

5. At the technical level, the delegation held discussions with national counterparts representing the following ministries, agencies and departments: the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministry of National Economy; the Ministry of Construction and Transport; the Ministry of Culture and Innovation; the Prosecutor General's Office; the Special Service for National Security; the Military National Security Service; TEK; the Office of the Prime Minister; the Department of Civil and Social Relations of the Prime Minister's Office; the Hungarian Central Bank; the National Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA); the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); the Standby Police Property Recovery Office; the Airport Police Directorate; Budapest Airport Ltd.; the National Directorate General for Aliens Policing; the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) National Central Bureau (NCB); the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary; the Police Headquarters of Csongrád-Csanád County; the National Bureau of Investigation of the Standby Police; the National Police Headquarters Criminal

Investigation Directorate; the National Information Centre; the International Criminal Cooperation Centre; the Department of Commerce; and the Hungarian Prison Service Headquarters. The delegation further conducted on-site visits to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport, to assess the practical implementation of aviation security measures, to the Röszke border-crossing point, and to the Victim Support Centre. The delegation also met with the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights and held a dedicated session with civil society organizations (CSOs).

6. The delegation is grateful for the support and cooperation afforded by Hungary, as well as for the open and constructive nature of the discussions held and the professionalism and expertise of the participating United Nations agencies and international and regional organizations.

## II. Current threats and challenges

7. Hungary, located at the heart of Europe, is not immune to the global threat of terrorism. Hungary has not been the victim of a significant terrorist attack; nonetheless, it remains on high alert, especially as it lies along major transit routes, which could be exploited for illegal entry by individuals with terrorist intent or affiliation.

8. Hungary stated that currently the terrorist threat was low and that there were no active right-wing terrorist organizations in Hungary. One of the main sources of the threat relates to the radicalization of individuals online, particularly through social media and encrypted messaging applications. Hungary pointed out that digital platforms, including dating websites, have been exploited for extremist recruitment. Specifically, Hungary considers that the radicalization of youth presents a particular challenge, as their digital presence makes them more susceptible and harder to identify through traditional surveillance methods. A further layer of complexity is added by the involvement of individuals with mental health conditions. The possibility of minors committing acts of terrorism is growing, and preventing the rapid radicalization of young people remains a serious challenge.

9. Hungary further stated that artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to generate radical content. The misuse of AI by terrorist actors includes the creation of fake users and videos; the dissemination of content in multiple languages; and the amplification of terrorist propaganda. According to Hungary, these trends highlight the growing sophistication of terrorist methodologies and the corresponding need for advanced countermeasures. Concerns were also expressed regarding the risk of irregular migration from North Africa and the Middle East, which, according to the authorities, is often linked with an increased risk of terrorist infiltration.

10. Hungary has not been the source of, or destination for, a significant number of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). According to the authorities, no Hungarian citizen had travelled to join ISIL (Da'esh) and associated groups in Iraq or the Syrian Arab Republic. However, Hungary's geographical location makes it a possible transit point for FTFs seeking to reach conflict areas in the Middle East or to return home. The authorities closely monitor developments in Member States and regions it considers a priority, including the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa.

11. Hungary is not considered to be directly affected by terrorism financing (TF), but it does face indirect risks because of its position as a transit country. A National Risk Assessment (NRA) was conducted in 2017 and in 2022. Cross-border cash transportation and the use of hawala and international remittances were identified in the NRAs as potential risks in the context of TF, as was Hungary's geographical proximity to countries with higher risks and cross-border movements of cash on the so-called Balkan route. The authorities have identified several risk situations that need to be monitored, including the increased use of virtual currencies.

12. Despite the low threat environment, the Government of Hungary remains vigilant. Hungary has made multidisciplinary efforts aimed at, inter alia, enhancing its counter-terrorism legislative and institutional framework and strengthening its border security. Hungary supports enhanced dialogue and operational coordination between the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on counter-terrorism. It has actively engaged in global training programmes and capacity-building packages and cooperates closely with the Council of Europe Committee on Counter-Terrorism. Hungary indicated that it supports enhanced dialogue, highlighting its contributions to the Global Coalition Against Da'esh — not only through participation in its working groups, but also as an active member of "Operation Inherent Resolve" and broader NATO efforts in Iraq. Its guiding principle is to address terrorism abroad in order to avoid "importing" the problem into Hungary. Hungary is currently involved in more than 400 projects relevant to stability, development, and counter-terrorism. One key initiative is the Hungary Helps Programme, a flagship foreign policy tool, which focuses on supporting entire communities and religious minorities, particularly Christian communities in the Middle East and Africa, to promote safe, secure, and dignified living conditions in conflict-affected areas.

13. During Hungary's presidency of the Council of the European Union in the second half of 2024, the Government emphasized the counter-terrorism agenda. Hungary has played an active role in working groups on terrorism, including within the TWP (Terrorism Working Party, focusing on internal security and police cooperation) and COTER (Council Working Group on Terrorism - International Aspects), addressing not only regional counter-terrorism priorities in Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Central Asia but also expanding the focus to the Sahel. In this regard, Hungary also added that one of the key achievements of the TWP was drafting the Council Conclusions on future priorities for strengthening joint counter-terrorism efforts. Reflecting the shared interests and perspectives of all Member States, these Conclusions were discussed and refined over multiple TWP sessions, producing a comprehensive, forward-looking strategic document to guide EU institutions, agencies, and national authorities in enhancing resilience against terrorism and violent extremism. There is a growing emphasis on strengthening responses to the internal-external coordination with regards to the nexus of terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism. This was reinforced by a recent Council of the European Union conclusion highlighting the need for the European Union to improve coordination and cooperation in this regard.

14. Hungary reaffirmed to the delegation its commitment to continue working closely with the United Nations to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Hungary has been offering targeted support to countries such as Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and several African nations in an effort to assist vulnerable communities, including pledging more than $130 million in assistance to support counter-terrorism institutions in these Member States. Particular support was

expressed for United Nations-led efforts in camps in the north-east of the Syrian Arab Republic, with a focus on the prevention of radicalization.

# III. Analysis of Hungary's implementation of Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178(2014), 2396 (2017), and other relevant Council resolutions

## A. Counter-terrorism legislation, judicial practice, and international cooperation in criminal matters

***International counter-terrorism instruments***

15. Hungary has ratified 15 of the 19 international counter-terrorism instruments. Hungary's domestic counter-terrorism framework is also based on regional instruments, including the European Union Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, which was subsequently replaced by the 2017 European Union Directive on combating terrorism. Hungary also ratified the 2005 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary actively manage the process of becoming a party to the four remaining international counter-terrorism instruments (recommendation 6).***[1] ***Hungary is also encouraged to consider joining the Convention on Compensation for Damage to Third Parties resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft (2009 Montreal Convention) (recommendation 41).***

***Definition of terrorist acts***

16. Terrorist offences are criminalized in Hungary's Criminal Code, which covers acts of terrorism and related ancillary offences. The main offence of committing a terrorist act is provided in section 314 of the Criminal Code. It is structured to include a general terrorist act that comprises terrorist intent in subsection (1), combined with a list of various acts in subsections (2) and (4).

17. First, the terrorist intent element includes an intent to "change or interfere with the constitutional, social or economic order of another state, or interfering with the functioning of an international organization". While the concept of "constitutional order" is defined in chapter XXIV of the Criminal Code, "social" and "economic" are not. When combined with the phrase "change or interfere with", which sets no minimum level of seriousness, the provision becomes broad and unclear. This raises questions about compatibility with the principles of legality and proportionality, as they may allow for an overly expansive interpretation that could capture forms of political expression, protest or civil disobedience that do not amount to terrorism.

[1] The 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation; the 2005 Protocol to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (2010); and the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (2010).

18. Second, the phrase "takes control of significant material assets" in subsection (2) appears intended to capture acts such as hostage-taking or the seizure of critical infrastructure. However, the term is vague and open to overly broad interpretation, which could risk misuse or inconsistent application. While jurisprudence may help to clarify its scope, defining the term more precisely in legislation would enhance legal certainty and reinforce necessary safeguards.

19. Following the visit, the authorities stated that Hungarian legislation must comply with the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism (hereinafter: the Convention) and Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism, which replaces Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amends Council Decision 2005/671/JHA (hereinafter: the Dir*ective). They added that* "the definition of terrorist act in the Directive and the newly introduced definition of terrorist offence in the Convention also include the notion of social and economic order.

20. The Committee takes note of these comments and of the fact that Hungarian law links the intent requirement to a closed list of serious predicate offences in Section 314(4), thereby reducing the risk of capturing ordinary protest. However, the Committee's concern relates to the formulation of the intent element—namely the phrase "to change or interfere with the… social or economic order." While the Directive and the Convention also refer to constitutional, social, or economic structures, the Directive limits relevant conduct to acts aimed at "seriously destabilizing or destroying" them. By contrast, the Hungarian Criminal Code uses the broader wording "changing or interfering with…," without a seriousness threshold, creating potential ambiguity about the scope of the provision and its compatibility with legality and proportionality.

21. ***The Counter-Terrorism Committee recommends that Hungary review section 314 of its Criminal Code to clarify the intent element and revisit overly broad and vague formulations, to ensure that only violent acts committed with terrorist intent are criminalized (<u>priority recommendation 1</u>).***

22. Third, some of the actus reus elements of the offence under subsection (4) consist of serious acts of violence or destruction, which appropriately limit the scope of the terrorism offence, as envisaged by the international instruments. However, Hungary's Criminal Code does not consistently include a separate outcome qualifier such as requiring that the act cause, or be likely to cause, death, serious injury, or substantial property damage. International counter-terrorism instruments typically structure the actus reus in two parts: the violent act itself, and the harmful outcome or potential consequence. The absence of this second element in Hungary's legislation risks capturing conduct that involves violence but does not reach the threshold of seriousness required under international law. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary review the Criminal Code to ensure that all terrorism offences include a clear outcome element such as the requirement that the act cause, or be likely to cause, death, serious injury, or substantial damage to property in line with the threshold of seriousness established in the international counter-terrorism instruments (<u>priority recommendation 2</u>).*** This would help to ensure that only conduct meeting the requisite level of harm is captured by terrorism offences, thereby preserving legal certainty and proportionality.

23. Following the visit, the authorities reiterated that Hungarian law must comply with the Convention and Directive (EU) 2017/541, and that neither instrument requires every terrorist

offence to contain a distinct harmful-outcome element. The Committee notes these comments and recalls that international instruments distinguish violent terrorist acts from ordinary violent crime through a seriousness threshold—requiring conduct that causes, or is likely to cause, death, serious bodily harm, or substantial damage. This threshold is reflected in Directive 2017/541 and in UN Security Council resolution 1566 (2004). Member States must comply with both binding United Nations Security Council standards and European Union minimum requirements. Several predicate offences in Section 314(4) may involve violence or endangerment but do not necessarily meet this serious threshold. Without an outcome qualifier, conduct falling short of it may nonetheless be labelled as terrorism solely based on intent.

***Criminalization of terrorism-related offences***

24. Hungary has codified the terrorist offences required by the international instruments to which it is a party. However, the delegation noted some concerns regarding Hungary's implementation of the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, specifically, articles 2(1)(a), on seizures or control over a fixed platform by force or threat, and 2(1)(c), on destroying a fixed platform or causing damage to it. Hungarian authorities advised that the relevant acts are covered by provisions of the Criminal Code, namely sections 314(2) on taking control of material assets, and 371on vandalism. While such acts could arguably fall within the scope of these provisions, the sections do not explicitly articulate the precise acts mentioned in the 1988 Protocol. In order to ensure both legal certainty and substantive compliance with Hungary's treaty obligations, such codification should closely mirror the language of the Protocol. ***The Committee therefore encourages Hungary to review section 314 of the Criminal Code to include the acts specific in articles 2(a) and (c) of the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (recommendation 7).***

25. Following the visit, the Hungarian authorities explained that under Section 314(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, anyone who, with the aim of changing or interfering with another state's economic order, commits a violent offence against a person, an offence causing public danger, or a weapons-related offence, is liable to ten to twenty years' imprisonment or life. The authorities consider that "economic order" includes terrorist acts targeting economic platforms, given their significant role in the economy.

26. The Committee notes Hungary's clarifications on implementing the 1988 Protocol and that certain acts under Articles 2(a) and 2(c) may be prosecuted under Sections 314(2), 314(4), or other Criminal Code provisions. However, the Committee is concerned that Articles 2(a) and 2(c) are not explicitly codified. While existing terrorism or public-safety offences may cover such conduct by analogy, the current wording does not clearly capture: the seizure of a fixed platform by force or threat (Article 2(a)); and the destruction or damage of a fixed platform endangering its safety (Article 2(c)), as distinct offences. International practice emphasizes legal certainty, with most States Parties mirroring the Protocol's language to reflect its actus reus, mens rea, and contextual elements. Hence, the recommendation for Hungary to consider amending Section 314 or introducing a dedicated provision explicitly covering the acts in Articles 2(a) and 2(c), enhancing clarity, limiting reliance on broad interpretation, and supporting consistent treaty implementation.

27. In addition to the definition of terrorism, ***the Committee notes that Hungary has criminalized a broad range of terrorism-related conduct, including threats, financing and incitement and welcomes this effort***.

28. During the visit, the delegation also discussed Hungary's legal framework on trafficking in cultural property. While Hungary has a robust legal framework for the protection of cultural heritage and criminalizes offences involving protected cultural goods, it does not specifically criminalize trafficking in cultural property for the purpose of TF. Rather, Hungary's legal system relies on general money-laundering and fiscal fraud provisions to address illicit trade in cultural goods. These include criminal penalties for theft, destruction, and illicit export of protected cultural goods under sections 357–358 of the Criminal Code, as well as the application of money-laundering offences (section 399) and fiscal fraud provisions where cultural property is involved. Hungary also relies on European Union Regulation 2019/880 on the introduction and import of cultural goods, which aims to prevent the financing of terrorism by restricting the entry of illicit cultural property into the European Union. However, the Regulation is an administrative instrument focused primarily on customs procedures and border control measures. It does not establish a criminal offence for trafficking in cultural property linked to terrorism.

In its resolutions, notably 2199 (2015), 2347 (2017) and 2462 (2019), the Security Council urges Member States to take effective legislative and operational measures to prevent and counter trafficking in cultural property when it benefits terrorist groups, including by holding those responsible accountable and considering the designation of such acts as serious crimes. While Hungary has taken important steps in this regard, there remains scope to further align its national framework with the expectations set out in the resolutions.

29. Following the visit, the authorities explained that under Sections 358(1)(a) and (c), unlawful alienation or export of protected cultural goods is a felony punishable by up to three years (abuse of protected cultural goods), and under Sections 318(1)(a) and (b), providing or collecting material support for a terrorist act is punishable by two to eight years (terrorism financing). They noted that while there is no separate offence for trafficking cultural property linked to terrorism, abuse of protected cultural goods for terrorism financing is punishable under Hungarian law.

30. The Committee notes that Sections 358 and 318 of the Criminal Code may apply when abuse of protected cultural goods finances terrorism. However, there is no specific offence criminalising trafficking in cultural property linked to terrorism, as required by relevant Security Council resolutions. Sections 357–358 protect cultural heritage but do not cover the full trafficking chain—acquisition, transfer, brokering, or marketing—nor situations where trafficking finances terrorism without direct intent to support a specific act. Section 318 requires proof of intent to facilitate a terrorist act, leaving a gap where value is generated for terrorist groups indirectly. Security Council resolutions 2249 (2015), 2347 (2017), and 2368 (2017) call on States to criminalise such trafficking as a standalone serious offence. A tailored provision is therefore needed to cover the full trafficking chain, independent of direct links to a particular terrorist act.

***Prosecution and adjudication of terrorism-related cases***

31. The Committee has recognized that the prosecution of terrorists has become increasingly complex and highly specialized. Prosecutors need to know typologies of incitement and of recruitment, and they need specialization, an understanding of charity laws, finance, information and communications technology (ICT), and methods of work of terrorist organizations, as well as an understanding of the range of available special investigative techniques. This process requires a degree of training, knowledge, skill and sophistication.

32. While the increasing complexity of terrorism prosecutions calls for dedicated and highly specialized expertise, Hungary does not currently operate a stand-alone counter-terrorism prosecution unit or have dedicated counter-terrorism judges, owing to the relatively low volume of such cases. Instead, Hungary has adopted a flexible approach whereby prosecutors with an interest in counter-terrorism may express their willingness to take on such cases and receive specialized training at least annually. In addition, the Prosecutor General's Office has institutionalized regular training on coercive measures affecting personal freedom, including their legality, proportionality, necessity, and safeguards. These topics are covered through centrally organized courses, targeted sessions for prosecutors at different levels of seniority, and dedicated modules in trainee programmes. Training materials are made widely accessible on the intranet, ensuring continued knowledge-sharing across the system. Prosecutors also benefit from participation in national and international conferences and joint training events with academic and professional institutions, which further enhance their capacity to uphold procedural safeguards in terrorism-related proceedings.

33. In parallel, Hungary has a structured system for judicial training, overseen by the President of the National Office for the Judiciary and implemented through the Hungarian Academy of Justice. This system includes both central and local training activities, covering initial and ongoing professional development. Courses on coercive measures affecting personal liberty are organized regularly, and a network of special advisers supports the application of European law and contributes to training on relevant jurisprudence, including that of the European Court of Human Rights. Hungary has also introduced regular and recurrent training for police and prosecutors focused on the intersection between terrorism and hate crimes. Strengthening capacity in this area is critical to ensuring that the legal response accurately reflects the motivations and intent underlying such acts, whether they fall within hate crime legislation, terrorism provisions, or both. ***The Committee commends Hungary for its investment in both prosecutorial and judicial training and encourages continued efforts in this regard to ensure consistent preparedness across jurisdictions, particularly in view of the evolving nature of terrorism threats and their intersection with fundamental rights.***

***Jurisdiction***

34. The jurisdictional scope of Hungary's criminal laws is set out in section 3 of the Criminal Code. In addition to the basic rule that Hungarian law applies to an offence committed within Hungary's territory, including on commercial ships, watercraft, or aircraft flying under the Hungarian flag, section 3(1)(c) extends jurisdiction extraterritorially to acts committed abroad by Hungarian nationals, provided the conduct is criminalized under Hungarian law. Section 3(2)

further extends Hungary's jurisdiction to certain acts committed abroad by non-Hungarian nationals. These include (a) offences that are punishable both under Hungarian law and the law of the place where the act occurred (dual criminality); (b) offences recognized as crimes against the State, such as treason or terrorism, even if not criminalized in the place where committed; and (c) offences under chapters XIII and XIV of the Criminal Code (which cover core international crimes), as well as any offence subject to mandatory prosecution under an international treaty ratified by Hungary. This framework establishes a solid basis for Hungary's jurisdiction over terrorism offences through the principles of territoriality, nationality, universality, and protective jurisdiction.

35. Despite this, the exercise of jurisdiction under section 3(2) is not automatic but rather subject to the discretion of the Prosecutor General. The delegation discussed with Hungary the importance of periodically reviewing the implementation of this provision to ensure that such discretion does not hinder the consistent and effective application of its jurisdictional obligations under the international counter-terrorism instruments to which it is a party.

***Pretrial detention***

36. Although international human rights law does not prescribe a uniform maximum duration for pretrial detention, the presumption of innocence, enshrined as a fundamental principle in international human rights instruments, requires that deprivation of liberty prior to conviction must be justified on the basis of necessity and proportionality, subject to rigorous and ongoing judicial review and should be considered the exception rather than the rule.

37. In this context, Hungary's 2018 Criminal Procedure Code introduced section 298, which establishes graduated maximum durations for pretrial detention corresponding to the severity of the alleged offence, ranging from one year for minor crimes to five years for offences punishable by life imprisonment, with a possible extension for particularly serious crimes, including terrorism.

38. However, Hungary's Constitutional Court, in Decision 10/2021 (IV.7), found section 298(2)(a) unconstitutional on the grounds that it permitted continued pretrial detention beyond the statutory limits in certain post-conviction phases, without adequate legal safeguards or temporal limitations. Although subsection (2)(a) has since been deleted, the remaining subsections – (b) through (d) – continue to permit detention beyond the statutory maximum during appeals, retrials, or proceedings following a conclusive decision. These exceptions raise serious concerns. Subsection (2)(b), for instance, allows pretrial detention to continue after a conclusive conviction, blurring the distinction between pre- and post-trial detention and undermining the procedural guarantees that attach prior to a final verdict. Subsections (2)(c) and (2)(d), which cover appeals and repeated proceedings following a setting aside, create the potential for indefinite detention through procedural cycles, with insufficient constraints on judicial discretion or duration. ***The Committee commends Hungary for codifying clear maximum durations for pretrial detention and welcomes the Constitutional Court's contribution to reinforcing safeguards that are central not only to Hungary's constitutional framework but also to the State's obligations under international human rights law, particularly the rights to liberty, judicial oversight, and the presumption of innocence. At the same time, the Committee recommends that Hungary consider further aligning its legal framework on pretrial detention with international human rights***

***standards to ensure that detention remains strictly necessary, proportionate, and subject to effective judicial oversight (recommendation 8).***

39. Following the visit, Hungary explained that Chapter XLVII of Act XC of 2017 regulates pre-trial detention, defined as judicial deprivation of liberty before a final decision. Initial detention before indictment lasts up to one month; post-indictment detention ranges from 1 to 5 years depending on the maximum penalty. The authorities further added that pre-trial detention follows the principle of graduality: it is applied only when less restrictive measures are insufficient (Sections 271, 277), and that courts review detention ex officio, extending it in limited increments or terminating it if no longer justified (Section 297).

40. The Committee notes that the statutory maximum periods and periodic judicial review, and underlines that the core concern remains the exceptions in Section 298(2)(b)–(d), which permit pre-trial detention beyond the statutory limits during appeals, retrials, or after conviction. As highlighted by the Constitutional Court (Decision 10/2021), these exceptions risk indefinite detention and blur the line between pre- and post-trial detention. Under international human rights law (ICCPR, ECHR), pre-trial detention must be exceptional, strictly time-limited, and justified by compelling reasons; periodic review alone does not suffice when the law allows extensions beyond statutory maxima. Hence, the Committee reiterates its recommendation that Hungary introduce clear temporal limits and additional safeguards for any detention exceeding the statutory maximums.

***Electronic evidence***

41. In Hungary, the legal framework governing evidence collection does not distinguish between electronic and non-electronic evidence. Electronic evidence is treated as part of the broader evidentiary regime under the Criminal Procedure Code, with investigative authorities empowered to obtain such material through standard procedural tools, including search, seizure, and production orders. Hungary does not maintain backdoor access agreements with communications service providers or other technology firms, and access to digital data must follow formal legal procedures.

42. For the preservation of electronic evidence, Hungary relies on the procedural mechanisms set out in the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), to which it is a party. This includes the ability to request the expedited preservation of stored computer data under article 16 and traffic data under article 17 of the Convention. While the system is generally effective, the delegation noted that challenges may arise in obtaining timely cooperation from service providers, particularly in cases involving encrypted platforms or communications service providers based outside the European Union. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary further examine its current legislative framework to ensure that it can adequately respond to the evolving landscape of technology-enabled counter-terrorism offences. A specific focus is recommended on enhancing the lawful, secure, and effective collection of electronic evidence in terrorism cases, especially in cases involving cross-border data access or transfer (recommendation 9).***

***Special investigative techniques***

43. The Committee notes that the use of special investigative techniques, such as covert surveillance and interception of communications, is a legitimate and often necessary tool in the prevention and investigation of terrorism. At the same time, the Security Council reiterated that Member States' counter-terrorism measures must comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law. In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights in *Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary* (2016) underlined that measures such as special investigative techniques must be subject to strict safeguards to ensure compliance with international human rights law, particularly the right to privacy. In that case, the Court found Hungary's legal framework governing secret surveillance for national security purposes to have certain shortcomings owing to several structural deficiencies: the absence of prior judicial authorization, the lack of a sufficiently precise definition of the scope of surveillance, and the broad and vaguely defined grounds on which surveillance could be ordered. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary ensure that its legal and institutional frameworks governing special investigative techniques are clearly defined, proportionate, subject to prior independent authorization, and accompanied by robust oversight and redress mechanisms to comply with international human rights standards and prevent arbitrary interference with fundamental rights in the context of counter-terrorism (recommendation 10).***

***Extradition and mutual legal assistance***

44. Hungary has established a comprehensive legal framework governing international cooperation in criminal matters, set out in Act XXXVIII of 1996. The Act covers not only extradition and mutual legal assistance (MLA) but also the transfer of criminal proceedings and the enforcement of foreign criminal judgments – matters that are typically only addressed through separate treaties. In addition, while Hungary may carry out extradition and MLA on the basis of treaty obligations and reciprocity, in accordance with common practice, it may also do so through ad hoc requests under section 6(2) of the Act, provided that core human rights and constitutional standards are met, including the prohibition of the death penalty and torture, and the principle of non-refoulement.

45. For extradition outside the European Union, the process is judicial in nature and is conducted through the Budapest Capital Regional Court, which reviews whether the legal criteria for extradition are met. The Court's decision may be appealed to the Budapest Capital Court of Appeal. Following a judicial determination, the Minister of Justice, as the designated central authority, assumes responsibility for the final decision on extradition. The Minister's discretion to refuse extradition is exercised in accordance with legal, humanitarian, and public policy considerations, consistent with Hungary's international commitments and domestic legislation.

46. For extradition within the European Union, Hungary implements the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in accordance with Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, through its Act CLXXX of 2012 on cooperation with European Union member States in criminal matters. Under this framework, extradition has been replaced by a simplified and exclusively judicial process, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions. EAW removes the need for

ministerial involvement**,** eliminates the political offence exception, and waives dual criminality for a list of 32 serious offences, including terrorism, provided the offence is punishable by at least three years' imprisonment in the issuing member State. This has significantly accelerated judicial cooperation across European Union borders.

47. Hungary employs a decentralized approach to MLA, with the designated authority divided between the Ministry of Justice and the Prosecutor General's Office, depending on the nature and scope of the request.

48. Hungary does not have an explicit legal provision requiring the refusal of extradition or MLA where there are substantial grounds to believe the request is made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person based on race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion. While Hungarian authorities advised that such requests are incompatible with article XV of the Constitution, which guarantees non-discrimination, and are therefore contrary to public order under section 2 of Act XXXVIII of 1996, this protection is implied rather than clearly stated in the law. Furthermore, constitutional protections are directed at preventing discrimination by Hungarian authorities, not at addressing the risk that the requesting State may act discriminatorily. In addition, while section 14/A(1) of Act XXXVIII prohibits extradition where it would breach an international treaty, this general clause does not replace the need for a specific bar to cooperation in cases involving discrimination. For full alignment with international standards and best practices, ***the Committee recommends that Hungary considers including an express provision requiring the refusal of extradition or MLA where there are substantial grounds to believe that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an individual on account of their race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion (priority recommendation 3).***

49. Hungary has proactively published its national extradition procedures on the Council of Europe website, on the web page of the Committee of Experts on the Operation of European Conventions on Cooperation in Criminal Matters. In addition to that effort, ***the Committee recommends that Hungary submit to the UNODC secretariat, for inclusion in its repository database, the contact information and relevant details of its designated authority for counter-terrorism matters, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2322 (2016). The Committee also encourages Hungary to publish this information on the website of its national central authority in multiple languages, together with procedural guidance and sample documents, to enhance accessibility and usability for other States (recommendation 11).***

***Non-application of the political offence exception to acts of terrorism***

50. In its resolution 1373 (2001), the Security Council calls upon all Member States to ensure, in conformity with international law, that claims of political motivation are not recognized as grounds for refusing requests for the extradition of alleged terrorists. Hungary's current legislation does not contain an explicit provision excluding terrorism offences from the political offence exception. While section 5 of Act XXXVIII of 1996 provides that the "ordinary nature" of certain crimes may outweigh their political character, specifically noting that intentional homicide and related offences are never to be considered political, this approach is not sufficiently comprehensive. It does not explicitly apply to terrorism-related offences such as incitement, financing, or material support, which may not involve homicide but are nonetheless serious acts

under international law. The lack of a clear and express legislative exception for terrorism offences creates legal uncertainty and could limit Hungary's ability to cooperate effectively in international terrorism cases, especially with States not party to the same treaties. ***The Committee recommends Hungary to consider introducing an explicit exclusion of terrorism offences from offences of a political nature for which extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters may be refused. (priority recommendation 4).***

51. Following the visit, Hungary explained that under Section 14(1) of Act XXXVIII of 1996 on international legal assistance, refugees recognized by Hungary or another EU Member State may not be extradited to the State from which they fled, except to a safe third country as defined in the Asylum Act. Sections 14(2) and (2a) extend this protection to beneficiaries of subsidiary or temporary protection, and to applicants for international protection. Section 14/A(1) further bars extradition if it would violate an international convention. Hungary concluded that these provisions align with the Committee's recommendations; however, Hungary may consider further clarifying the International Criminal Legal Assistance Act, potentially by autumn 2026. Hungary further advanced that under Sections 5(2)– (3) of the International Criminal Legal Assistance Act, an act is not considered a political offence if, based on its purpose, motive, manner, or means, its criminal nature outweighs any political character. Intentional homicide and related offences are always deemed criminal. Accordingly, terrorist acts involving homicide cannot be refused for legal assistance or extradition on the ground that they constitute political offences.
The Committee notes Hungary's clarifications and acknowledges that Sections 14(1), 14(2), and 14/A (1) of Act XXXVIII provide important protections for refugees, beneficiaries of international protection, and compliance with international treaties. However, these provisions apply only to refugees, protection beneficiaries, or applicants, leaving out individuals at risk of discriminatory prosecution abroad based on race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, or political opinion. International standards call for a general bar applicable to any person where there are substantial grounds to believe an extradition request is discriminatory, which should be explicit rather than inferred. The Act also does not clarify that terrorism offences—including financing, incitement, recruitment, or material support—are excluded from the "political offence" exception. Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) calls upon States to ensure that claims of political motivation cannot bar extradition of alleged terrorists, making an explicit legislative exclusion necessary. Finally, reliance on constitutional interpretation or general clauses (e.g., public order, treaty compliance) does not provide sufficient guidance for judicial and executive authorities, particularly in cases involving non-European Union states.

### *Aut dedere aut judicare*

52. Hungarian authorities stated that the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare* is reflected in section 4(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that criminal proceedings shall be initiated when authorities become aware of an offence subject to public prosecution. While this provision constitutes a general prosecutorial obligation, it does not fully codify the specific and unconditional duty to prosecute or extradite required by Hungary's obligations under international counter-terrorism instruments, including the 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. These instruments require that where a suspect is found on the territory of a State Party, and extradition is not carried out, the case must be submitted without exception and without

undue delay to the competent national authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Importantly, the obligation to prosecute arises regardless of whether the State receives an extradition request. This obligation has been authoritatively interpreted by the International Court of Justice in the case of *Belgium v. Senegal*,[2] which clarified that the effective implementation of *aut dedere aut judicare* entails (a) securing the presence of the suspect; (b) conducting a prompt preliminary inquiry; (c) notifying other States with potential jurisdiction; and (d) submitting the case for prosecution without delay when extradition is not carried out. While the first three steps may be addressed through a combination of legal provisions and institutional procedures, the final requirement must be clearly reflected in domestic law to ensure legal certainty and full compliance with treaty obligations. As it stands, Hungarian legislation does not contain an express provision mandating the unconditional submission of such cases for prosecution in the absence of extradition, regardless of whether an extradition request was made. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary expressly codify the principle of* aut dedere aut judicare *in its domestic law. This would ensure that all elements of the principle as required in the international counter-terrorism instruments are covered (recommendation 12).***

53. Following the visit, Hungary shared that Sections 37–42 of Act XXXVIII of 1996 on international legal assistance in criminal matters govern the transfer of criminal proceedings. According to Hungary, these provisions comply with the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare*. However, Hungary noted that the introduction a specific provision addressing terrorist acts in the Act will be further examined.

54. The Committee takes notes of the additional information and commends Hungary for considering the Committee's recommendation in this regard. The Committee reiterates that under international counter-terrorism instruments, *aut dedere aut judicare* applies whenever a suspect is present in a State Party and extradition is not granted, including cases where no extradition request has been made. States are required to submit such cases to their competent authorities for prosecution without exception or undue delay. Hungarian law contains no express provision mandating this unconditional prosecution in the absence of an extradition request. The cited transfer-of-proceedings rules govern discretionary cooperation with other States but do not establish the treaty-required fallback obligation. As affirmed earlier by the ICJ in *Belgium v. Senegal*, *aut dedere aut judicare* requires a clear domestic legal basis ensuring prosecution whenever extradition fails.

## B. Countering the financing of terrorism

55. Hungary has significantly amended and strengthened its legislative and regulatory framework for anti-money-laundering (AML)/CFT and has addressed various deficiencies identified in the course of the 2016 mutual evaluation by the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism's (MONEYVAL) and CTED's stocktaking exercise of 2019.

[2] *Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012*, p. 422.

***Strategic framework on anti-money-laundering/countering the financing of terrorism***

56. Hungary has largely implemented the preventative and regulatory measures required to enable its financial sector to combat TF, including by enhancing cooperation and coordination on policymaking and operational levels: the AML Coordination Council (AMLCC) was set up in 2019 as a high-level strategy-setting forum, involving senior management participants from all public institutions involved in combating money laundering and terrorism financing; the role of its Anti-Money-Laundering Subcommittee has been reinforced; the National Bureau of Investigation with the police force has the overall responsibility of investigating TF; the Hungarian FIU (Office for Anti-money-laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (PEI)) operates within NTCA to receive and analyse suspicious transaction reports, disseminate financial intelligence, support AML/CFT frameworks and monitor and supervise certain regulated sectors, it alsohas supervisory responsibilities and is tasked with the implementation of targeted financial sanctions;; and TEK, using police powers granted under chapter 7 of the 1994 Police Act, conducts covert operations and collects intelligence, including from foreign counterparts.

***Assessment of terrorism-financing risk***

57. Resolution 2462 (2019) introduced new requirements with respect to regular assessments of TF risk to which Member States are exposed, as well as of the economic sectors most vulnerable to the financing of terrorism, including non-financial services (such as the construction, commodities and pharmaceutical sectors).

58. So far, Hungary has conducted two national money-laundering/TF risk assessments (NRAs), in 2017 and in 2022, and is in the process of updating the latest NRA, with an expected completion date of 2026. The 2017 NRA assessed 43 separate activities, sectors, criminal activities and systemic problems. Hungary has subsequently developed an action plan to address risks identified through Resolution 1688/2017 (IX.22) containing a comprehensive two-year action plan based on specific risk assessments by the Central Bank of Hungary and other risk-based supervisory procedures. The tasks of the AMLCC include following up on these action plans and strategy. The Government also appointed a Commissioner on AML/CFT.

59. According to the 2022 NRA, the overall TF risk in Hungary is low, with the main threats involving the following: the collection of funds and their transfer through financial and non-financial institutions; cash couriers; the online decentralization of communications, although this is not a Hungary-specific issue; the use of digital payments and their anonymity; and the use of cash and the hawala system.

60. The report of the 2022 updated NRA can be accessed by reporting entities but is not publicly available. According to authorities, this is because there are a number of assessments which could be exploited by criminals, and they did want to make a sanitized version for public use. The exercise examined more than 50 risk aspects in different sectors and covered financial and non-financial businesses.

61. According to the authorities, the private sector was involved in the risk identification and risk assessment stages of the NRA, though not in the development of risk-mitigating measures. Discussions with the private sector took place mainly through supervisory authorities. The exchanges were not extensive and some of the former's experiences were gathered through the ministry in charge of preparing the NRA. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to further extend the array of stakeholders it consults on evolving TF risks, including representatives of the private sector that are not subject to AML/CFT reporting obligations but may be vulnerable to TF, including research and academia, the non-profit organization (NPO) sector and civil society (recommendation 18).***

62. Hungary conducted a specific risk assessment of NPOs as part of its 2022 NRA. Authorities stated that they have identified some organizations that would fall within the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) definition of NPOs and that they could not identify their risk of TF abuse. However, this has not been sufficiently substantiated. The features and types of NPOs likely to be at risk of TF abuse have not been identified. Following the visit, the authorities shared that a dedicated risk assessment of NPOs was carried out in the second half of 2025, to evaluate potential money-laundering and terrorism-financing risks. They further shared that a similar assessment for NPOs is foreseen for late 2025.

63. ***In the course of the ongoing update of the 2022 NRA, the Committee recommends Hungary extend the TF risk analysis to economic sectors beyond those represented by reporting entities, including non-financial services, which can be vulnerable to TF, in line with paragraph 14 of resolution 2462 (2019) (recommendation 20). The Committee further recommends that Hungary reflect on the evolving TF risks and threats in the context of multifaceted and diverse regional and global trends, including the increasing use of digital methods to raise and transfer funds across borders (recommendation 20)***.

***Criminalization of terrorism financing***

64. Hungary has been a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism since 2002. In addition, Hungary is a party to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism.

65. Hungary amended its Criminal Code with effect from January 2018. There are two categories of TF offences under sections 318 and Section 318/A(1). The newly introduced section 318/A(1) criminalizes TF as a stand-alone offence and does not require a link to a specific terrorist act. Article 318 now states that any person who provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used in order to carry out an act of terrorism or who provides material assistance to a person who is making preparations to commit a terrorist act or to a third party at his behest is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment between two to eight years.

66. While section 318 criminalizes the provision/collection of funds to both individual terrorists and terrorist organizations, section 318/A(1) criminalizes TF only with regard to the provision/collection of funds to individual terrorists and not to terrorist organizations. The section

criminalizes the financing of a "criminal offence of a terrorist nature" (which may include preparatory acts, threats, or less severe crimes with a terrorist intent) and the support/financing of a person involved in such an offence. Both sections mention the provision or collection of "material means".

67. Hungary has adopted European Union definitions of "funds and economic resources" with regard to offences generally. "Material means" is defined in the Criminal Code (Section 319 (2)) by reference to Council Regulation EC 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, effectively covering all types of funds, assets and economic resources.

68. The penalty for the financing of individuals under section 318(1) amounts to a felony and entails imprisonment from two to eight years. The penalty under section 318(2) applies to the financing of terrorist groups and entails imprisonment from 5 to 10 years. The penalty in section 318/A(1) is up to three years' imprisonment (significantly lighter than in section 318). The authorities explained that no amendments are contemplated at this point as it is not deemed necessary. So far, there have only been a few TF convictions in Hungary, and therefore it is difficult to assess any challenges in the practical implementation and effectiveness.

***Financing of foreign terrorist fighter travel***

69. The criminalization of the financing of travel of FTFs is addressed in section 316/A, which provides for imprisonment for the provision/collection of "material means" for the purpose of a person's travelling to facilitate the commission of a terrorist attack or to join a terrorist group. The offence is sufficiently broad to include providing or receiving terrorist training.

***Financial intelligence, investigating and prosecuting terrorism financing, including financing of foreign terrorist fighter travel***

70. Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019) highlight the value of financial intelligence and financial investigations in counter-terrorism and include new requirements in this regard. In resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council explicitly calls upon Member States "to conduct financial investigations in terrorism-related cases and to seek ways to address the challenges in obtaining evidence to secure terrorist financing convictions". It also urges States to establish or strengthen "a framework allowing competent national authorities, in particular financial intelligence units, intelligence services, law enforcement agencies, prosecutorial and/or judicial authorities, to gather and share information on the financing of terrorism", as well as to intensify and accelerate the timely exchange of relevant operational information and financial intelligence regarding actions or movements, and patterns of movements, of terrorists or terrorist networks, including FTFs, returnees and relocators.

71. The police (National Bureau of Investigation) have the overall responsibility for investigating TF matters and taking all appropriate CFT measures, including prevention. According to the authorities, the National Bureau of Investigation has nationwide jurisdiction and sufficient capacity to conduct investigations into terrorism and its financing. The law enforcement approach to the financing of terrorism is the same as with other offences that need to be investigated ex officio, and TF cases do not take priority. Any suspected terrorism-related

investigation includes financial aspects and following the money trail. There are no specialized investigative units focusing on terrorism and/or related (financial) offences.

72. At the intelligence level, TEK, which is a part of the police, plays an essential role. In 2018, TEK established a unit for the prevention and detection of TF. At the time of the visit, the unit was staffed with six experts trained in operational intelligence gathering. TEK and FIU collaborate closely and participate in working groups.

73. Activities with suspected FTFs are also under police and TEK scrutiny. FIU contributed by developing FTF profiles and indicators and sharing them with the private sector and the authorities involved in CFT, including customs authorities and NTCA.

74. Hungary is enhancing its capacity to investigate and prosecute TF, notably through inter-agency trainings on national procedures, information exchange channels and collection of admissible evidence. In recent years, Hungary has conducted multiple trainings on TF risks, trends and typologies for various national authorities and increased the capacities of the Prosecutor General's Office and its Anti-Money-Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Unit. Today, the Unit is staffed with seven prosecutors.

75. During the visit, the authorities shared information on some recent and ongoing investigations, including a case in 2015, during which, based on intelligence from TEK, the National Bureau of Investigation investigated Syrian nationals suspected of having contacts with terrorist organizations. Debit cards were seized.

76. Another case, in 2020, categorized as TF, involved two refugees from the Kurdistan region from the Turkish side. They admitted to having provided services to the Kurdistan Freedom Party and, as it is a listed entity, they were charged with TF and sentenced to one year and eight months' imprisonment. For the past five years, Hungary has not adjudicated any cases related to TF.

77. In 2019, FIU launched a project aimed at enhancing TF investigation and prosecution activities. The project resulted in a three-day training, in 2021, with the involvement of all relevant authorities. The private sector was also invited. Other internal trainings were also organized. In 2022, a conference was held at which the results of the training were discussed. An investigations handbook is available in English. ***The Committee commends Hungary for these efforts and encourages it to continue to enhance its capacity to investigate and prosecute TF, notably through joint inter-agency trainings on applicable national procedures, information exchange channels and collection of admissible evidence (recommendation 21).*** These efforts are particularly important in the absence of any practical national experience in adjudicating TF charges. Hungary would also benefit from practical experience sharing with the prosecutorial and judiciary authorities of States that have successfully prosecuted and adjudicated complex TF cases.

78. ***The Committee recalls that, in resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council calls upon Member States to conduct financial investigations in terrorism cases and therefore recommends that Hungary introduce a clear legal basis for mandatory parallel investigations and establish policies or standard operating procedures to ensure that relevant financial flows are considered in every terrorism investigation, including in relation to FTFs (recommendation 22).***

79. FIU operates within NTCA, as an independent department of NTCA, receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports, disseminating financial intelligence, supporting AML/CFT frameworks and monitoring and supervising certain regulated sectors. In addition, FIU's core functions include disseminating the results of analyses of suspicious transaction reports and suspending transactions if necessary. FIU does not have any investigative powers and is considered a hybrid model, combining the powers and functions of an administrative model while positioned within a law enforcement body.

80. Hungary's FIU has increased its effectiveness and operationality in recent years. This is demonstrated by an increasing number of transaction suspension orders (statistics provided to the delegation). FIU has two analytical units that are adequately staffed and seem to have the requisite skills and knowledge to develop high-quality financial intelligence. FIU seems to be adequately resourced and to have access to sophisticated software and a wide range of government information and databases.

81. The delegation noted that a new bill had been recently approved and was awaiting executive signature, which would facilitate the sharing of information by FIU to a wider range of stakeholders.

***Measures to prevent cross-border transportation of cash for terrorism-financing purposes***

82. Hungary has a declaration system for sums exceeding €10,000, both for incoming and outgoing cash. The new Cash Control Act provides customs authorities with direct powers to stop or retain currency or bearer negotiable instruments for 30 days to assess its origin. This period may be extended for a period not exceeding 90 days. ***Hungary is encouraged to continue enhancing the capacity of its relevant agencies, including the Customs Committee, to prevent, detect and suspend the use of cash couriers to move funds for TF purposes, including through proactive inter-agency coordination, the development of TF-specific risk indicators, and the use of consolidated designation lists at customs controls (recommendation 24). The Committee further encourages Hungary to consider giving customs officials powers to detain currency or bearer negotiable instruments where there is a suspicion of involvement in money-laundering or terrorism financing, or where a false declaration or no declaration has been made (recommendation 24).***

83. During the visit to the Röszke border-crossing point, customs officers reported that cash smuggling is more widespread than gold and other precious metals. Customs officers do not have a tool to assess gold purity (according to the latest European Union regulation, all gold/precious metals worth more than €10,000 must be declared like their cash equivalents). The Committee recommends that Hungary provide technical assistance to customs officers on checking gold content, in accordance with the introduction of the latest European Union regulation, which requires that all gold/precious metals worth more than €10,000 must be declared like their cash equivalents. Training in X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy technology for front-line officers would assist in this regard.

84. ***The Committee further recommends that Hungary establish systematic information exchange between the NTCA and FIU, especially regarding cash seizures, investigations and potential or confirmed links to TF offences (recommendation 26). Hungary is further encouraged to increase real-time cooperation between customs and border officials and law enforcement agencies in order to better assist customs and border officials to identify persons who may be cash couriers and identify potential ties to TF (recommendation 26).***

***Measures to prevent the terrorist abuse of money value transfer services or informal financial networks, and emerging digital payment methods***

85. In its resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council recognized that innovations in financial technologies, products and services may offer significant economic opportunities but also present a risk of being misused, including for TF. Resolution 2462 (2019) explicitly mentions abuse of legitimate businesses (including emerging payment methods, such as prepaid cards, mobile payments, virtual assets, and innovative financial technologies) for the purposes of TF.

86. The legal definition of virtual asset service providers (VASPs) is based on the provisions of European Union Regulation 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets, which is aligned with the FATF definition of VAs and VASPs, covering both legal and natural persons. As of the 1st of January 2025, VASPs are supervised by the Central Bank of Hungary, which has powers to supervise and ensure that VASPs comply with AML/CFT requirements including the authority to conduct onsite inspections. In 2020, the FIU (under its previous supervisory capacity) conducted a strategic analysis to better understand VASP activities, identify non-compliant VASPs, and enhance inspection methodologies. According to the authorities, service providers (up to 10 institutions) operational before 30 December 2024, had until 2025 to renew their licenses in order to fulfil all the new requirements at the European Union level. This process was still pending at the time of the visit. Most operators were too small to maintain their activities and some have ceased operations. The small institutions are expected to merge into bigger ones. The 2022 NRA assessed risks related to VASPs. The Central Bank requires risk assessments before introducing new products or services, as outlined in annex section 6 of the Central Bank of Hungary Decree. International cooperation and information exchange mechanisms are in place for covered VASPs. The AML/CFT Act requires that a full licensing procedure applies to VASPs (including having appropriate operational processes, governance structures, internal controls measures and internal policies, as well as the toolkit and procedures for risk assessment and mitigation), that VASPs are monitored and supervised in a risk-based manner, and that all VASPs maintain sound understanding and effective screening processes and tools of sanctions, as well as that adequate SAR reporting requirements are in place. At the time of the visit, there were no local VASPs licensed to operate by the MNB in Hungary.

87. Emerging financial technologies, such as crowdfunding platforms for example, currently do not fall under the AML/CFT regime. No licensing is required yet. Only one institution, operating out of Malta, provides services in Hungary. The new European Union AML/CFT legislative framework, adopted in 2024, is planned to enter into force in 2027 and will also take effect in Hungary at that time.

88. Under section 3 of the Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises Act (Act CCXXXVII 2013), money remittance services are defined as financial auxiliary services, and a licence is

required from the Central Bank of Hungary. Money exchange offices may only be operated by banks and their agents. Under article 408 of the Criminal Code, any person who provides financial services or auxiliary financial services without authorization is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment of up to three years. At the time of the visit, five service providers were licensed. The law requires that they appoint a contact person, which facilitates the supervisory activity.

89. The MONEYVAL follow-up reports have flagged money value transfer services (MVTS) for money-laundering and TF risks. There is also a serious concern about hawala-type alternative money transfers, which may be used by terrorist supporters. Hungary is aware that MVTS could be used for TF purposes.

90. An amendment was introduced in 2025 to the AML/CFT Act explicitly prohibiting anonymous accounts.

91. ***The Committee welcomes Hungary's efforts to assess and address potential TF risks associated with virtual assets and, as appropriate, new financial instruments, including but not limited to crowdfunding platforms, as required in resolution 2462 (2019)*. *The Committee encourages Hungary to continue assessing and addressing these potential TF risks and implement accordingly the regulatory framework applicable to virtual assets and VASPs to ensure that they are regulated for AML/CFT purposes and monitored and supervised in a risk-based manner, as required in FATF recommendation 15*. *Hungary is further encouraged to use the non-binding guiding principles on preventing, detecting and disrupting the use of new and emerging financial technologies for terrorist purposes adopted by the Committee in January 2025 (priority recommendation 15).***[3]

*Freezing of terrorist funds*

92. In resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council stresses the need for effective implementation of asset-freezing mechanisms pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001), including considering third party requests from other States. In resolution 2462 (2019), the Council also calls upon States to invest resources in the implementation of sanctions regimes pursuant to resolutions 1373 (2001), 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) and in seizure of funds during investigations.

93. PEI has supervisory responsibilities and is tasked with the implementation of targeted financial sanctions. Hungary implements freezing decisions pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) by means of Council of the European Union Regulation (EC) No. 2580/2001. However, during the visit, the delegation discussed with the authorities the fact that Hungary does not have a national mechanism for identifying and requesting the designation of non-European Union terrorists or terrorist entities under Regulation 2580/2001. It also does not have a mechanism for independently designating and freezing the assets of Hungarian or European Union citizens on a national basis pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).

94. Following the visit, the authorities shared the following developments related to the above: In September 2025, Hungary established a national terrorist list to strengthen counter-terrorism

[3] S/2025/22, available at https://docs.un.org/S/2025/22.

efforts, targeting organizations and individuals. The listing process, initiated by the Minister responsible for counter-terrorism or justice and based on information from law enforcement and intelligence agencies, includes continuous review and government approval. Individuals linked to terrorist groups or acts can be designated, with notification provided unless it risks national security. Decisions outline sanctions and legal remedies, which can be challenged before the Supreme Court, and designations are reviewed annually. Financial restrictions, asset freezes, and travel bans are applied in line with European Union and United Nations rules. ***Hungary is encouraged to keep the Committee informed about the implementation of the newly established list.***

95. The FRM Act requires financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions and public registries (real estate registers, company registers, vehicle registers, registers of vessels and navigation facilities, aircraft registers, official registers of cultural heritage) to monitor on an ongoing basis new designations under the relevant Security Council resolutions and European Union regulations, although the FRM Act does not extend its requirements to all natural and legal persons. In situations where reporting entities or public registries identify facts or circumstances which suggest that they are in possession of funds or other assets related to a designated person, they are required to immediately submit a report to FIU and refrain from performing any transactions involving those funds or assets for four business days (chapter 3 of the FRM Act). Within this time frame, FIU is required to determine whether the funds or other assets are subject to freezing under relevant Security Council resolutions. The time frame does not favour freezing assets without delay.

96. When assets are identified as belonging to designated persons or entities, an application is made to the court. Security Council designations are published on PEI's website. PEI has a "sanctioning guide", which does not seem to provide guidance to reporting entities on identifying, reporting and freezing assets of designated entities but instead sets out penalties for non-compliance. Hungary does not appear to be designating individuals or entities based on information available from PEI. Both PEI and NTCA have mandates relating to targeted financial sanctions.

97. The grounds for designations pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) are defined as (a) the person or entity commits or attempts to commit terrorist acts or participates in or facilitates the commission of terrorist acts; or (b) being an entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any such person; or (c) being an entity acting on behalf of or at the direction of any such person or entity.

98. Hungary has not made any national designations pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) with regard to terrorist organizations or individual terrorists, including FTFs. While Hungary utilizes instead European Union mechanisms to order the listing of entities and individuals and the freezing of their assets, ***the Committee recommends Hungary to actively manage the implementation of the newly adopted national listing process which introduced a domestic mechanism, implementing the asset-freezing requirements in resolution 1373 (2001). Where applicable, Hungary should also submit designations to the Security Council or the Council of the European Union (priority recommendation 16).***

99. Hungary is aware of the deficiencies in its implementation of the targeted financial sanctions pursuant to the Security Council designations, notably the delay in communicating updated information to the reporting entities, and is working on improving technical solutions, which could ultimately also be used in the context of national designation under resolution 1373 (2001). ***The Committee would welcome updated information on these ongoing improvements.***

100. ***With respect to national designations for the purposes of freezing terrorist funds and other assets, and in addition to the information generally available in public sources (including dedicated websites and public laws and regulations), Hungary is encouraged to develop procedures to formally notify listed individuals and entities of their designation as soon as possible after it has taken effect, to inform of them of (a) the designation and its implications, and unclassified information concerning the summary reasons for designation;[4] (b) the review procedure and information on the delisting process, including a contact point within the Government to address any questions regarding the process; (c) publicly releasable information concerning the reasons for designation; and (d) procedures to allow licensed access to funds or other assets, for basic and extraordinary expenses as soon as possible.[5] In addition, Hungary is encouraged to stipulate a periodic review of existing designations and freezing measures, in the absence of petitions, to make sure that the grounds for maintaining the measures continue to exist and, if not, delist and unfreeze (recommendation 27).***

***Protecting the non-profit sector from terrorism-financing abuse***

101. In resolution 2462 (2019), the Security Council explicitly recognizes the vital role played by NPOs in national economies and social systems and encourages Member States to work cooperatively with the NPO sector to prevent the abuse of such organizations by terrorists and their supporters, while recalling that States must respect human rights and fundamental freedoms. In resolution 2462 (2019), the Council also calls upon Member States to periodically conduct a risk assessment of its NPO sector or update existing ones to determine the organizations particularly vulnerable to TF and to inform the implementation of a risk-based approach.

102. Hungary conducted a risk assessment of NPOs as part of its 2022 NRA but has not identified those organizations that meet the FATF's definition of NPO. Measures taken after the adoption of the MONEYVAL mutual evaluation report are not based on the identification and analysis of TF risks.

103. In the absence of an evidence-based assessment of the sector's TF risks and vulnerability and the effect of regulatory measures in place, the application of the above-mentioned measures to all public associations operating in Hungary, rather than focusing on particular subset(s) that are most vulnerable to TF abuse, constitutes a clear lack of a risk-based approach. ***Therefore, Hungary is encouraged to conduct a thorough risk assessment of its NPO sector and review the CFT measures currently applicable to all public associations operating in the country, to ensure***

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[4] See FATF, "International best practices: targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing (recommendation 6)", June 2013, available at www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/BPP-Fin-Sanctions-TF-R6.pdf.coredownload.pdf; materials of the Amsterdam meeting of October 2012 (launch of the global initiative aimed at helping Member States set up effective mechanisms to freeze terrorist assets in accordance with their obligations under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001)) and subsequent regional workshops (Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Ashgabat, The Bahamas, etc.).

[5] Ibid.

***that such measures are focused, proportionate and risk-based; apply only to the narrow subset(s) of NPOs that are identified as particularly vulnerable to TF risks, and do not unduly disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activities, as required in resolution 2462 (2019) and the recent revisions introduced to FATF recommendation 8, its interpretative note and best practice paper (priority recommendation 17).***[6] ***Hungary is also encouraged, in close consultation with the NPO sector and financial institutions, to continue its efforts to raise awareness of its financial institutions on good practices and decrease de-risking practices in relation to the sector (recommendation 28).***

104. Following the visit, the authorities reported that, as part of follow-up work to the 2022 NRA, the Prime Minister's Office conducted a risk assessment of 'classic' civil society organizations (foundations and associations). Using qualitative and quantitative analysis, the assessment applied four criteria: (i) donation or distribution activities; (ii) annual turnover consistently above HUF 5 million; (iii) no public-benefit status; and (iv) non-compliance with the obligation to submit and publish annual financial reports. It identified 111 organizations with potential ML/TF risk exposure, none of which met all four criteria. A similar assessment of not-for-profit business entities is planned for late 2025. ***The Committee notes Hungary's updates provided after the visit, namely the risk assessment of a subset of the NPO sector. At the same time, the Committee reiterates its earlier recommendation for Hungary to conduct a thorough risk assessment of its NPO sector and design CFT measures accordingly.***

105. At the time of the visit, the delegation noted the steps taken by Hungary in relation to outreach activities to NPOs, including through the NPO Unit of the Prime Minister's Office. General guidance and outreach have been provided to the NPO sector through resources such as the Civil Information Portal, the Civil Handbook, Smart Booklets, and training programmes, such as the Civil Organization Leadership Training, and Civil Community Service Centres. However, it is unclear whether these initiatives specifically addressed CFT. The CTF outreach was limited in scope (presentations by the Ministry of Economic Development at annual civil society meetings) and an online training platform, with a dedicated module on AML/CFT risks. The Ministry of Finance also conducts outreach through presentations to NPOs on the risks of potential exposure to TF. Following the visit, the authorities shared that a working group was drafting a Code of Ethics to guide civil society organizations on grants, fundraising, and operations, promoting transparency and preventing misconduct. From January 2026, Civil Community Service Centres must include an annual training on "Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Civil Sector" with at least 10 participants as part of their accreditation. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to continue its efforts to raise awareness of its NPO sector regarding the risks of it being abused for TF purposes, in close consultation with the sector and relevant financial institutions (recommendation 29).***

106. FIU uses its information technology (IT) system (PEKIR) to prioritize TF- and NPO-related cases and promptly shares relevant information with competent authorities in accordance with section 48(1)-(2) of the AML/CFT Act. It is also able to respond to international requests under sections 49–53 of the Act. In addition, steps have been taken to enhance NPO accountability,

[6] FATF, *Best Practices: Combating the Terrorist Financing Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations* (Paris, 2023), available at www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/BPP-Combating-TF-Abuse-NPO-R8.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf.

notably through revised financial reporting obligations under government resolution 479/2016. Hungary is currently drafting a new act aimed at organizing the registration process for new NPOs.

107. The delegation noted that the Law on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad (Law LXXVI 2017) has been assessed by the Human Rights Committee as incompatible with Hungary's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and that MONEYVAL had observed that the Law does not appear to address any money-laundering or TF risks identified in previous NRAs. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to review the Law on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad (Law LXXVI 2017) to address money-laundering and TF risks identified in previous NRAs (recommendation 31). Furthermore, the Committee recommends that Hungary continue updating its assessment of TF risks in relation to its NPOs to ensure a risk-based approach as required by the recent revisions to FATF recommendation 8, its interpretative note and best practice paper (recommendation 31).***[7]

108. Pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 2462 (2019), Member States should take into account the potential effects of its CFT measures on exclusively humanitarian activities that are carried out by impartial humanitarian actors in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law. According to information provided after the visit, Hungary reported that the 2026 work programme of the National Economic and Social Council—an independent consultative and advisory body—includes issues concerning donations and charitable activities of civil society organizations, as well as planned presentations on private–public cooperation areas, which may contribute to a common understanding of TF risks. More generally, ***Hungary could also consider establishing a consultation mechanism for the Government, donors, NPOs and humanitarian actors to improve their common understanding of TF risks and of the possible impact of CFT requirements on international human rights and international humanitarian law (priority recommendation 32)***.

***Linkages between organized crime and financing of terrorism***

109. In resolution 2482 (2019), the Security Council calls upon Member States to continue to conduct research and collect information to enhance knowledge of and better understand the nature and scope of the linkages that may exist between terrorism and organized crime, whether domestic or transnational, and to intensify and accelerate the timely exchange of relevant operational information and financial intelligence regarding actions, movements and patterns of movements of terrorists or terrorist networks.

110. Several international organized crime groups operate in Hungary, controlling much of the criminal activities in the country, including human and drug trafficking, vehicle theft, money-laundering and firearms trafficking. Organized crime in Hungary is complex, with international connections. Hungary has observed the arming of criminal gangs operating in northern Serbia, with weapons frequently supplied by Albanian organized crime networks based in Albania, Kosovo, and southern Serbia. Hungary has issued a report detailing the involvement of Afghan terrorist groups in organizing human smuggling operations in Serbia, near the Hungarian border.

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[7] FATF, *Best Practices: Combating the Terrorist Financing Abuse of Non-Profit Organizations* (Paris, 2023), available at www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/BPP-Combating-TF-Abuse-NPO-R8.pdf.coredownload.inline.pdf.

A close collaborative relationship has been built with the law enforcement and security agencies of the West Balkan region and Serbia.

111. In addition, given Hungary's position as a transit country, particularly for individuals from conflict-affected regions, and the risk of exploitation by migrant smugglers and human traffickers, ***the Committee encourages Hungary to strengthen implementation of the Protocols to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Trafficking in Firearms (recommendation 13)***. These instruments support not only the investigation and prosecution of organized crime but also efforts to address its potential links to terrorism.

112. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to assess linkages between organized crime (including drug and human trafficking) and TF as part of the ongoing update of the NRA and ensure that proactive investigations into such linkages are regularly conducted when investigating new cases of organized crime (including illicit drugs and weapons trade) (recommendation 33). Hungary is also encouraged to analyse any gender-specific implications with respect to TF trends and measures in place to counter them (including but not limited to NPOs, and links between human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and TF, etc.) (recommendation 34).***

113. To further address risks at the nexus of terrorism and organized crime, ***Hungary is encouraged to enhance the application of complementary instruments, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the three International Drug Control Conventions (recommendation 14)***.

## C. Law enforcement

### *Structure and coordination*

114. Security and law enforcement responsibilities in Hungary are divided between several entities: the Hungarian National Police, TEK, the National Information Centre (NIK), the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the Special Service for National Security, the Information Office, the National Directorate General of Disaster Management, the National Protective Services, NTCA, and the National Directorate General of Aliens Policing.

115. Act XXXIV of 1994 is the primary law governing the National Police. There are also several specialized units with special competence under the National Police headquarters, including the Rapid Response and Special Police Services, which are responsible for supporting local police forces and acting as riot police; the National Bureau of Investigation, a special investigation bureau with nationwide competence in the field of transnational and organized crime, including terrorism; and the Airport Police.

116. TEK is a specialized law enforcement agency under the direct supervision of the Minister of Interior, with exclusive competence in counter-terrorism coordination and operations

nationwide. It was established in 2010 to integrate the counter-terrorism tasks of law enforcement and civilian secret services into a single organization.

117. At the national level, TEK is responsible for information and intelligence gathering and analysis and assessment of the terrorist threat, as well as operational tasks. It prevents, detects and interrupts terrorist activities and gathers intelligence regarding terrorism-related activities in Hungary. TEK has specific powers at the national level to coordinate the fight against terrorism, based on its own analysis and evaluation. It plays a special role in handling possible emergency situations and in the operational coordination of counter-terrorism activities. TEK is not an investigating authority. That task is carried out by the National Bureau of Investigation attached to the National Police.

118. In 2022, the political governance of the civilian national security services was unified, the body supporting the Government's national security decisions was restructured, and NIK was established. NIK is tasked, inter alia, with serving as a single-channel information system supporting decision-making and inter-agency cooperation. All relevant law enforcement agencies cooperate under NIK in accordance with section 30/A of Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services, which constitutes the main legal basis for the operation of the Hungarian national security services.

119. Overall, law enforcement in Hungary is intelligence-led, operational and has established inter-agency cooperation, collection and exploitation of information capabilities on terrorism and organized crime, mainly under TEK and the NIK. For example, cooperation and data sharing between the prosecutor's office and the NIK are governed by Instruction 27/2017 (XII.22.). It authorizes the Prosecutor General's Office to provide NIK with unsolicited information on serious crimes—including terrorist acts and terrorist financing—and establishes a clear legal basis for both bodies to request data from each other for specified purposes. The delegation acknowledged Hungary's efforts to address new trends in terrorism and organized crime and the evolving security environment. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to build upon this progress and to continue efforts to ensure that terrorism-related information is disseminated in a timely and systematic manner to all relevant authorities with mandates and tasks in implementing counter-terrorism-related measures (recommendation 36).*** A mapping of the information needs of all relevant authorities, such as civil aviation, could be beneficial in this regard. The delegation also discussed with Hungary the possibility to further expand domestic partnerships based on a whole-of-government and a whole-of-society approach and engage with non-governmental and civil society actors.

***Risk management***

120. In accordance with Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services, the national security services of Hungary are tasked with providing NIK with the information acquired in the course of performing their duties as specified in the law and necessary for the exercise of the duties and powers of NIK. Other relevant agencies, such as the National Police and NTCA, are defined as cooperating bodies in the Act.

121. Among other things, NIK analyses, evaluates and transmits information necessary for government decisions relating to organized crime that threatens national security, in particular

terrorism, illegal drug and arms trafficking, and the illegal international traffic in weapons of mass destruction and their components, as well as the materials and equipment necessary for their production. NIK is tasked with preparing briefings and risk analyses on the security, national security, terrorist threat and criminal situation of Hungary, specific risks and crimes for the cooperating bodies to facilitate their lawful, professional and effective performance. NIK makes a proposal for determining the level of terrorist threat based on the assessment of information regarding the terrorist situation in Hungary. As stated above, the Intelligence Directorate of TEK is also responsible for assessing the national level of terrorist threat and providing relevant information to NIK.

122. While acknowledging the above-described inter-agency organization and development of operational threat analyses conducted by NIK, it wasn't clear to the delegation how systematic national risk assessment is carried out, in particular the assessment of the remaining vulnerabilities after evaluating the effectiveness of the security measures currently in place. The risk management process should also ensure that the appropriate mitigation measures are implemented by all relevant authorities with responsibilities in counter-terrorism.

123. Regarding risk management, and while acknowledging that operational risk management is in place for some sector specific-levels (such as the National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP), which establishes a general requirement to conduct a regular security risk assessment for civil aviation), ***the Committee recommends that Hungary supplement its threat assessment measures with vulnerability assessments and consideration of existing mitigation measures so as to enable a more comprehensive national risk management process and ensure that a comprehensive national risk assessment be disseminated to all relevant authorities with responsibilities in counter-terrorism (priority recommendation 36).*** Considering that NIK has the authority to call on any cooperating body to provide data and information, as well as to supplement and clarify the data and information provided, a national risk management process could be built upon the existing structure and functions of NIK.

### *Investigations and use of digital evidence*

124. The Criminal Procedure Code designates the police, as the investigative authorities, to perform general police tasks and investigative tasks. NTCA is granted investigative powers for crimes prescribed in the Code, such as abuse of dual-use products.

125. The national security services do not conduct investigations or preparatory proceedings; however, Act CXXV of 1995 on national security services provides that national security services may apply the measures defined in the Act to prevent, and apprehend the perpetrator of, criminal offences falling within the functions of national security services. During the performance of their tasks, national security services may restrict, in accordance with the Act, the right to personal freedom, privacy of the home and personal secrets, confidentiality of correspondence, protection of personal data, access to data of public interest and protection of possessions. Also, within the framework of secret information-gathering, national security services may conduct covert surveillance on a person relevant to their tasks, a related home, other premises or fenced area, a public place or a place open to public, or a vehicle; may gather information about the events and may record, using technical means, the things observed; with some exceptions, intercept conversations and may record, using technical means, the discussions held; and may obtain data

necessary for ascertaining the fact of communication through an electronic communications device or information system, for identifying the electronic communications device or information system, or for determining their location. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to ensure, including with ongoing review, that its legal framework allowing for secret surveillance for security purposes is consistent with the principles of legality, proportionality, and necessity and that effective and independent oversight mechanisms are in place (recommendation 39).***

126. If a criminal proceeding is instituted on the basis of data acquired by secret information-gathering under the Prosecution Service Act, the Police Act, the NTCA Act, or the National Security Services Act, any covert means that is applied must be applied in compliance with the Criminal Procedure Code after the criminal proceeding is instituted. At the time of instituting a criminal proceeding, authorities can still use covert methods permitted under the earlier Acts mentioned above, even if similar methods were already used during the intelligence-gathering phase but must now comply with the Criminal Procedure Code. This allows for continuity in investigations, ensuring that evidence collection is not interrupted, while still transitioning to the Criminal Procedure Code.

127. Electronic data are defined in law as the appearance of facts, information or concepts in any form that is suitable for processing by an information system, including the program that ensures the execution of a function by the information system. Electronic data are considered automatically as material evidence.

128. Online terrorist activities are a strategic priority for TEK. A specialized unit within TEK's Intelligence Directorate is tasked with monitoring online platforms for terrorism-related content. The Directorate focuses on various forms of politically motivated terrorism, including right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, TF, lone actors, religion-based terrorism, and threats linked to international relations. TEK's operational structure includes support units for human intelligence, open source intelligence, and IT-based monitoring and cover operations. An analytical division is responsible for strategic and operational analysis, as well as database management. TEK has begun integrating AI into its operations and is actively training officers in its use, although this initiative remains in its early stages.

129. TEK also monitors FTFs and transiting FTFs. A designated subunit within TEK also supports FIU, and suspicious financial transactions are reported when detected by TEK.

130. The National Bureau of Investigation plays a key role in transatlantic counter-terrorism investigations. It investigates all types of terrorism-related crimes and currently has three ongoing investigations based on intelligence received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the United States of America. These cases involve threats of terrorism and murder, and digital evidence has been successfully utilized in the investigative process. Hungary has recently renewed its cooperation agreement with FBI, reinforcing its commitment to international collaboration in counter-terrorism efforts.

***Regional and international cooperation in law enforcement***

131. Act LIV of 2002 on international cooperation between law enforcement agencies provides the legal framework for non-judicial-assistance-type cooperation between Hungarian law enforcement agencies and foreign authorities in the prevention and prosecution of crime. Unless otherwise provided for in the Act, requests for information must be forwarded to the foreign authority by the police's International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre (NEBEK), and the request of the foreign authority must be sent to NEBEK, which forwards the request to the Hungarian law enforcement agency with the authority and competence to execute the request. NEBEK may also execute the request and transfer the information directly, as specified in the Act on cooperation and exchange of information within the framework of the European Union Law Enforcement Information System and INTERPOL.

132. TEK takes part in bilateral and multilateral international cooperation and engages in direct networking with the liaison officers accredited to Hungary, communicates with partner services through secure channels, and participates in international organizations and events. Hungary is involved in multilateral law enforcement professional forums, such as the ATLAS network (an association of law enforcement special intervention units from European Union member States and associated countries), the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), the South-East European Law Enforcement Centre, the International Law Enforcement Academy and the Central European Police Academy.

133. As a State member of the European Union, Hungary has a seat on Europol's Management Board and has a Liaison Bureau, currently comprising five liaison officers. Hungary contributes to the European law enforcement community, carrying out and participating in many successful and impactful operational actions in the areas of migrant smuggling, trafficking in persons, and economic and financial crimes, etc. Its operational cooperation with Europol is also good, with the Hungarian Liaison Bureau at Europol and all the competent national authorities.

134. Hungary (through TEK) entered information on FTFs from third countries into the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) under the provision of article 24 of the SIS Regulation, which provides for entry bans. As a member of the Schengen area, Hungary plays a crucial role in maintaining the security and integrity of the Schengen area, particularly with regard to the European Union's external borders, which it shares with Ukraine to the east and Serbia to the south. This is particularly important in the counter-terrorism domain, given the potential risk of FTFs exploiting systems, for instance by infiltrating migration routes. Hungary has a Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) connection to securely exchange messages with the law enforcement agencies of other countries (both European Union and third countries under cooperation agreements with Europol or the European Union). In addition, to facilitate the exchange of operational messages restricted to counter-terrorism units of the countries connected to SIENA, Hungary has opted in for SIENA counter-terrorism. The latter communication channel is preferable when rapid exchange of information between counter-terrorism units is needed.

135. The Europol Information System (EIS) is Europol's central database for criminal information and intelligence, covering all mandated crime areas, including terrorism. It serves as a reference system, enabling users to check if information on a person or object of interest (such as a vehicle, telephone, or email message) is available beyond national or organizational jurisdictions. Authorized users in designated authorities of the member States can conduct searches in the system. If initial results are found, users can request additional information through their

Europol National Unit. EIS is linked to SIENA, which facilitates follow-up on searches and hits. Hungary is a significant contributor to EIS and is one of the most active member States in utilizing its search functionality.

136. TEK is the Hungarian counterpart in cooperation with the European Counter-Terrorism Centre of Europol (ECTC). Hungary participates in the Counter-Terrorism Joint Liaison Team with one Liaison Officer (TEK). The Team is a core and focused group of counter-terrorism liaison officers, which serves as a platform for the swift exchange of operational information and actionable intelligence among counter-terrorism experts and analysts from the European Union member States, associated non-European Union countries, and ECTC.

137. Hungary has been a member of Europol's Counter-Terrorism Programme Board since 2019. It is a steering tool to establish and implement the operational priorities for ECTC. The membership is restricted to law enforcement counter-terrorism authorities, and the Board is composed of a limited number of countries (currently 18). Hungary is represented on the Board by TEK. Hungary is strongly engaged in the Board's workplan, which drives the priorities for ECTC (allocation of resources and areas of work).

138. Hungary is affiliated with all of Europol's counter-terrorism-related Analysis Projects (APs): AP Hydra on the phenomenon referred to as "Jihadi terrorism"; AP Travellers on Terrorists travelling to conflict zones; AP Dolphin on all terrorism phenomena except "Jihadi terrorism" (i.e., right wing, left wing, anarchist, separatist, eco, single cause, etc.); AP Core International Crimes on genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity; AP Terrorist Financing Tracking Programme, based on an agreement between the European Union and the United States; for terrorism-related cases, Europol receives – upon request – information on financial transactions made via the official banking sector and/or money transfer companies; and AP Check the Web on online terrorist propaganda and terrorism-related content. The APs provide law enforcement agencies access to all information available in the counter-terrorism databases and to services and products (operational/strategic analysis, deployment of ECTC's specialized teams, forensic analysis, Internet investigation, contacts with online service providers, etc.). ***The Committee acknowledges Hungary's contributions and involvement in terrorism cases and operational actions***.

139. Hungary is part of the European Network of Special Intervention Units through TEK's Special Intervention Unit, which plays an active role in the Network's activities. Hungary is an active member of Europol's European Explosive Ordnance Disposal Network. During 2022–2023, Hungary organized and implemented several trainings in this area (supported by the European Union International Security Fund). Hungary also contributes to the strategic reports drafted by Europol, namely the European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report which is the biannual Outlook Report on Developments in Terrorism in the European Union and is regular participant in the right-wing extremist group interviews. Hungarian authorities are well aware of ECTC's European Union Internet Referral Unit capabilities, its services and its products and makes full use of them.

140. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to continue its established cooperation level, further develop international cooperation efforts on counter-terrorism and maintain close engagement with its international partners, to enhance its capacity to prevent and counter***

***terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Europe and beyond (recommendation 40).***

### *Oversight of law enforcement agencies*

141. Act XXXIV of 1994 provides mechanisms for oversight, including judicial review of certain police decisions, particularly those involving surveillance and communication interception. As of 2015, and in accordance with the National Security Services Act, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights may inquire into ordering and conducting a review of national security checks on the basis of improprieties related to fundamental rights. If, on the basis of an inquiry, the Commissioner concludes that there is an impropriety, the Commissioner may make a recommendation to the authority or to the supervisory organ of the authority subject to inquiry in order to redress the impropriety. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to continue and, where possible, strengthen the institution of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights by ensuring that public organs respond or follow up to the Commissioners' recommendations and that effective mechanisms for remedies are put in place for the individuals whose rights have been violated (recommendation 41).***

142. TEK operates under specific legal constraints. It does not have open investigative powers and cannot take measures that restrict property rights or personal freedom. However, when TEK apprehends or detains individuals at the request of the National Police Headquarters, the legality of these actions is reviewed by the competent prosecutor's office. Oversight of TEK's covert intelligence gathering is exercised by different authorities depending on the legal basis: the Minister of Justice supervises actions under the National Security Services Act, while courts and, in some cases, the prosecution service oversee actions under the Police Act and the Criminal Procedure Act.

### *Watch lists or databases of known and suspected terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters*

143. In its resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council decided that Member States shall develop watch lists or databases of known and suspected terrorists, including FTFs. Such watch lists or databases should be integrated and unclassified to enable their use by law enforcement, border security, customs, military, and intelligence agencies to screen travellers and conduct risk assessments and investigations. Hungary does not have an integrated and accessible counter-terrorism watch list. Hungary enforces entry bans on foreign FTFs by inserting their data into SIS, which is used as the main information exchange channel.

144. TEK manages terrorism-related classified information and data and has access to national databases relevant to law enforcement. TEK also carries out screening against United Nations and European Union sanctions lists. Other organizations do not have direct access to data managed by TEK, but they receive information for official duties by request.

145. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary develop or transform the existing database(s) into a national integrated unclassified watch list or database and that it establish a legal framework that provides for nomination criteria by category, thresholds and differentiation***

***between watch-listed individuals based on the identified threat they pose to national security. (priority recommendation 37).*** This should be accompanied by an effective oversight mechanism and an established redress process accessible by individuals who have experienced restrictions on freedom of movement and have reasons to believe that these difficulties stem from being included in the national counter-terrorism watch list or database.

146. The delegation noted that in order to avoid arbitrary inclusions and potentially discriminatory targeting of members of a specific community, a Member State's watch-listing system should be defined in light of the definition of terrorism offences and in a manner consistent with Security Council resolutions, obligations under international counter-terrorism conventions, and applicable international human rights obligations. The addition of any individuals to a watch list should be based on an assessment of whether the available information provides a sufficient and credible basis for inclusion. ***Hungary is also encouraged to consider engagement with civil society groups in order to better address and incorporate their concerns and suggestions in developing accountable and transparent watch-listing practices (recommendation 42).***

147. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to explore ways to enable the cross-checking of biometric data and advance passenger information (API)/passenger name records (PNR) data, to support identity verification of watch-listed individuals. The Committee also encourages Hungary to enable sharing that information through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms (recommendation 43).***

*Use of INTERPOL tools*

148. INTERPOL's NCB in Budapest is part of the International Law Enforcement Cooperation Centre, which is the national crime investigation branch of the national police force. The Centre is the lead agency for international police cooperation involving Hungary.

149. The delegation learned that NCB provides information to other law enforcement entities, but access to the I-24/7 system has not been extended beyond NCB. Some databases are also populated on a case-by-case basis. In order to further strengthen the capacity of the national law enforcement entities, including searching INTERPOL databases in real time as part of their investigations and sharing sensitive and urgent police information with their counterparts around the world, ***the Committee recommends that Hungary extend access to the I-24/7 system beyond NCB, to all relevant national law enforcement entities, as well as strategic locations such as airports and border-crossing points, including the airport and border-crossing points (priority recommendation 38). Furthermore, the Committee encourages Hungary to systematically populate relevant INTERPOL databases and conduct more searches, including in biometrics databases (INTERPOL Facial Recognition System (IFRS), Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), and DNA), and increase biometric data flow (images, fingerprints and DNA samples) of suspected and convicted terrorists via INTERPOL channels and systematic inclusion of biometrics linked to all terrorist profiles in INTERPOL data sets and alerts (recommendation 44). The Committee also recommends that Hungary make full use of the INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) and Ballistic Information Network (recommendation 45).***

***Preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons***

150. The legal framework on firearms comprises the Hungarian Firearms Act (Act XXIV of 2004) and its implementing regulation, Government Decree 253/2004 (VIII.31.). Section 325 of the Criminal Code regulates criminal offences related to firearms and ammunition. Section 326 addresses criminal offences with weapons prohibited by international conventions. In addition, the Criminal Code, in section 347, criminalizes the unauthorized removal of firearm markings, categorized as misuse of a unique identification mark. This provision is a key element in maintaining the traceability of firearms.

151. In Hungary, the regulation of firearm markings is governed by Decree 31/2006 (VI.1.) of the former Ministry of Economy and Transport. It outlines the procedures for examining firearms and their components, ensuring compliance with safety and identification standards.

152. To prevent diversion of firearms, the police and customs authorities employ risk analysis during inspections, evaluating factors such as the economic operator, the type of commodity that was declared, the route and other risk indicators. They also cooperate with other competent authorities to prevent illegal shipments, and data exchange may occur as part of this process.

153. The National Police are responsible for licensing ownership of firearms to individuals, while the Government Office of the Capital City of Budapest handles licensing for foreign nationals. Firearms inspections in Hungary are handled as part of the licensing and regulatory framework for civilian firearm ownership. The police, particularly at the level of the county police headquarters, play a central role in managing firearm licences and related procedures, including inspections.

154. Law enforcement agencies in Hungary utilize the National Firearms Query System, which is accessible only to authorized personnel. Each user is assigned a unique login identification, ensuring that all queries are traceable and accountable. In cases of lost or stolen firearms, the licence holder is legally obligated to report the incident to the police, who then issue a warrant notice. These incidents are recorded in the HERMON warrant registry system, which is overseen by the Warrant Registry and Coordination Department of the Criminal Investigation Directorate General of the National Police Headquarters. Access to HERMON is restricted to credentialed individuals, and all data entries and queries are logged. The system includes domestic, European, and international warrants, regardless of whether the record pertains to a loss or a criminal offence.

155. During investigations, the police utilize data from the National Firearms Query System and the HERMON warrant system and may send requests to foreign partner agencies through specialized systems such as SIENA. Search notices for individual firearms are issued by the law enforcement authority handling the case. These notices are subsequently entered into the SIS II system, with coordination handled by the Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries (SIRENE) Bureau within NEBEK. If a match is found in connection with a domestic SIS alert or object search, the information is relayed to the authority that issued the original notice. In

cases involving foreign seizures, the SIRENE Bureau or the INTERPOL NCB of Hungary, also operating under NEBEK, is notified and coordinates with the relevant Hungarian authority.

156. Any suspicion of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition, or explosives is immediately reported by the police to the Ministry of Interior and the TEK and ORFK (National Police Headquarters) duty officers in turn notifies the TEK Intelligence Directorate. The latter operates a 24-hour duty service to check and scrutinize urgent cases and assess whether there is any suspicion of terrorism. If such suspicion exists, TEK takes the necessary measures in coordination with the police. In cases involving illegal arms trafficking, TEK conducts covert intelligence gathering if there is any indication of a connection to terrorism. If a seized firearm is found to be linked to terrorism, TEK, NIK, and the National Bureau of Investigation are notified. In such cases, the investigation is transferred to the National Bureau of Investigation. However, there is currently no information indicating that firearms seized by the police had been brought into Hungary for terrorist purposes.

157. At the national level, several interconnected systems support firearms-related crime investigations, including the Hungarian Police Case Management System and databases for seized firearms. When requests concerning illegal firearms are received from other European Union member States or other States, NEBEK, as the national firearms focal point, coordinates the response. NEBEK also coordinates with the 2020–2025 European Union Firearms Strategy and European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats initiatives.

158. Hungary does not maintain a separate registry for missing or stolen firearms; instead, such data are managed within the unified Warrant Registry System. The INTERPOL I-24/7 system has not been fully integrated with Hungary's national systems, and uploads to the INTERPOL iARMS database are conducted on a case-by-case basis. TEK has direct online access to national and international warrant systems, including those containing identification of lost or stolen firearms and INTERPOL-issued warrants.

159. NTCA plays a critical role in border and internal controls. It performs inspections at external European Union borders and conducts in-depth inland checks. Equipped with mobile and handheld X-ray machines, endoscopes, and other detection tools, NTCA officers are trained in vehicle searches and participate in European Union training programmes. Customs inspections cover all cargo and passenger vehicles, including their contents and structural cavities. NTCA regularly detects and seizes illegal weapons and ammunition at border crossings and during inland patrols.

160. Weapons detection efforts in Hungary have revealed that nearly all intercepted firearms have been automatic weapons. These firearms were primarily transiting along routes between the Western Balkans and Western Europe, with Hungary's southern border serving as a critical point of interception. Investigations into the origin and intended destination of these firearms are conducted by the police. However, the police as the investigative authority does not inform NTCA of the result of the investigation, even when the weapon was detected by NTCA. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary ensure that the outcomes of the investigations conducted by the police into the origin and intended destination of intercepted firearms are communicated to customs authorities, particularly when there is a potential link to terrorism.*** Such feedback

supports NTCA's risk analysis and enhances operational awareness, contributing to more effective border security and counter-terrorism measures ***(recommendation 46).***

161. To control access to precursors and components used in the illegal manufacture of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), Hungary has implemented Regulation (EU) No. 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors through Government Decree 8/2017. Oversight of these materials is shared between the National Police and the National Directorate General for Disaster Management under the Ministry of Interior. TEK conducts covert intelligence-gathering operations to verify any domestic or foreign information suggesting the use of such substances for terrorist purposes.

162. Section 330 of the Criminal Code addresses criminal offences with dual-use items, including their supply without authorization, or by exceeding the scope of the authorization, or use of dual-use items in an unauthorized way. The same section also refers to the transfer of chemical weapons and chemical instruments of war covered by annex 1 to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, as promulgated by means of Act CIV of 1997, to the territory of Hungary, or to the customs territory of the European Union from Hungary, and nuclear dual-use items.

163. ***The Committee notes that Hungary has established a comprehensive legal and operational framework for preventing terrorist acquisition of weapons and explosives. The Committee recommends that Hungary ensure that its national recordkeeping system(s) allow for interconnectivity with iARMS to enable the relevant authorities to record illicit firearms therein and search seized firearms to determine whether they have been reported as lost, stolen, trafficked, or smuggled (recommendation 47).*** This would further strengthen Hungary's capacity to identify firearms-trafficking patterns and smuggling routes.

***Unmanned aircraft systems***

164. Hungary has responded to the globally increased concern over the potential threat posed by the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for terrorist purposes and has created a policy framework on UAS. The regulation of UAS falls under the authority of the General Directorate for Air Transport, which serves as the national civil aviation authority. As a member of the European Union, Hungary adheres to the regulatory framework established by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). This includes compliance with the EASA Basic Regulation, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 on the design and manufacture of UAS, and Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947, which governs the technical and operational aspects of UAS use. These regulations classify UAS operations into three categories – open, specific, and certified – based on the weight of the UAS and the nature of its intended use.

165. In addition to civil aviation oversight, Hungary has established specialized national security measures for protection against UAS. A dedicated unit within the national security services is responsible for counter-UAS operations. TEK plays a role in protecting critical infrastructure, including airports, supported by the Special Service for National Security, is involved in UAS detection and counter-UAS operations.

166. Hungary has developed an application for operators to ensure safe movement of UAS. *Mydronespace* promotes regular and safe UAS operations by informing users in real time about the current state of Hungarian airspace and about areas prohibited or restricted for UAS activity.

167. Hungary maintains a national UAS registration system and is actively engaged in international cooperation on drone-related security. Hungary participates in the European Network of Law Enforcement Technology Services, specifically in the working group focused on drones and countermeasures, which it joined in December 2024. Hungary has also been a member of the European Survey Group on UAS since 2024, reflecting its commitment to collaborative efforts to enhance drone security across the European Union.

168. ***The Committee commends Hungary for taking proactive measures to develop its framework for countering the threat posed by the use of UAS for terrorist purposes, and requests that Hungary keep it informed of its experiences in developing operational capacities in the area of counter-UAS***.

***Measures to protect critical infrastructure and soft targets***

169. Hungary's framework for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is governed by Act CLXVI of 2012 on the Identification, Selection, and Protection of Critical Systems and Installations, updated in 2020. This legislation defines critical infrastructure as the infrastructure of a service, device, facility or system belonging to one of the designated sectors, that provides services that are indispensable for fulfilling critical societal tasks – especially healthcare, personal and asset safety of the people, economic and social public services, national defence of the country – and the failure of which would have significant consequences owing to the lack of continuous provision of such services.

170. In July 2020, Hungary renewed its legal framework for CIP. Under the amended regulations, operators of critical infrastructure are required to appoint a security liaison officer, who is responsible for preparing an Operator Security Plan and maintaining communication with the relevant authorities. The Plan must be based on a comprehensive risk analysis that considers the full spectrum of threats, including third-party vulnerabilities, and evaluates impact, probability, and exposure. Authorities conduct inspections at least once every five years to verify compliance with the Plan and ensure the resilience and continuity of critical operations.

171. TEK plays a strategic role in CIP. Mandated by Government Regulation 295/2010 (XII.22.), TEK is responsible for conducting threat assessments, supporting security action plans, and participating in annual exercises. TEK also maintains direct cooperation with infrastructure operators and provides operational support in the event of an attack. A monitoring system is in place to facilitate rapid communication between operators and TEK.

172. Cybersecurity is a vital component of Hungary's CIP strategy. The National Cybersecurity Centre, established in 2015 and operating under the Special Service for National Security, is responsible for safeguarding computer systems, including the Government's infrastructure. The Centre plays a key role in implementing European Union-wide cybersecurity measures under the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive of the European Union, and, as of 2024,

Hungary has adopted the NIS2 Directive through new legislation. The Special Service for National Security has become the primary responsible entity for State cyber-defence activities.

173. On 20 December 2024, Hungary enacted two major cybersecurity laws: Act No. LXIX of 2024 on Cybersecurity and Act No. LXXXIV of 2024 on the Resilience of Critical Entities. The 2024 Cybersecurity Act replaces previous legislation and aligns Hungary's cybersecurity framework with European Union standards. It took effect on 1 January 2025, reinforcing Hungary's commitment to maintaining a resilient and secure infrastructure network. It expands the scope of regulation to include State-owned enterprises exceeding medium-sized thresholds and designates entities as "essential" or "important" based on their services and data processing functions. Organizations must classify their systems and data into "basic," "significant," or "high" security categories, which must be reviewed every two years or following incidents or regulatory changes. The Act on the Resilience of Critical Entities ensures continuity of designation for operators previously identified under the 2012 CIP Act.

174. ***The Committee commends Hungary for its efforts to implement the provisions of Security Council resolution 2341 (2017), notably through the development of a comprehensive framework for the protection of critical infrastructure, including the designation scheme. The Committee encourages Hungary to share its practices, including lessons learned, with the Committee and other States. The Committee would welcome further information on Hungary's practices, including lessons learned, on the protection of soft targets in accordance with Security Council resolution 2396 (2017).***

## D. Border management

***Structure and coordination***

175. Hungary has made significant investments in border management aimed at strengthening migration governance and preventing illegal border crossings. Owing to its long external borders, Hungary plays an important role in the European Union internal/external security link, by ensuring the effective implementation of Schengen regulations, with a particular focus on counter-terrorism.

176. The delegation recalled that as a European Union member State, Hungary implements Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No. 767/2008 and (EU) No. 1077/2011. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to keep it informed of progress in the implementation of the EES, including on experiences once the system is fully operational.***

177. Since 2015, Hungary has implemented a multilayered border defence system, including physical infrastructure such as fences, surveillance systems, and the use of UAS.

178. Hungary's approach to border management is aligned with the European Union's Integrated Border Management (IBM) concept. The Ministry of the Interior coordinates the

implementation of Hungary's National Integrated Border Management Strategy of 2022–2028, which is based on Government Decision 1299/2024. This strategy outlines 78 strategic objectives and is designed to reflect both European Union policy and national specificities. It includes components such as border surveillance, risk analysis, inter-agency cooperation, information exchange with European Union institutions and member States and other countries, technical and operational measures, return procedures for third-country nationals, quality control mechanisms, and the protection of fundamental rights.

179. A key element of Hungary's IBM strategy is the development of risk analysis capabilities. Chapter 5 of the strategy (points 24–28) focuses on enhancing risk analysis through systems such as the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model and the European Border Surveillance System and the creation of a web-based risk analysis interface. These tools facilitate information exchange between the police and other agencies involved in border control and support the preparation of joint risk assessments. Strategic objectives 13 and 19 specifically address the need to improve screening and monitoring capacities, particularly in relation to FTFs.

180. To support these efforts, Hungary launched the IBM Project in 2024, aimed at establishing a centralized governance structure for integrated border management. A national coordination platform has been created, supported by four expert groups focusing on strategic planning, operations, training, and implementation. The project is scheduled for completion by the end of 2026 and includes the integration of automated systems and AI to enhance surveillance and response capabilities. Future plans include the deployment of UAS that can autonomously track individuals based on camera and motion sensor data, with officers monitoring from centralized situation rooms. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to share progress and updates with the Committee regarding the IBM project.***

181. The National Police Border Policing Department operates a 24/7 National Coordination Centre, which facilitates real-time coordination and data-sharing with partner authorities, including the National Directorate General for Aliens Policing, NIK, and NTCA. Hungary also maintains several national databases relevant to border control, including the Alien Policing System, the Travel Document Database, the Personal Data and Address System, the Road Traffic System, and the Wanted Persons System. They are integrated with information from European Union and international systems such as SIS, the European Travel Information and Authorization System, EES, the Visa Information System, Public Key Directory (PKD), and INTERPOL databases.

182. Risk assessment mechanisms are a core component of Hungary's border control strategy. Risk indicators are regularly updated based on intelligence from counter-terrorism bodies and are categorized according to threat levels. Special risk analysis units have been established, and officers receive regular training on new indicators. Tools such as profile cards, multilevel profiling, and situation reports are accessible through an intranet system at border-crossing points (BCPs). Hungary also uses the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) FTF Common Risk Indicators, which are updated periodically with input received from the European counter-terrorism community, as part of its profiling methodology.

183. Hungarian police officers are deployed to neighbouring countries to support joint operations. Since January 2025, Hungary has implemented a new operational framework with Romania, allowing for joint border controls similar to those already in place with Austria. These joint operations, which now have a legal basis in Romanian territory, aim to enhance the detection of illegal migration. Hungary also conducts joint patrols with Austrian and German officers on international train routes.

184. Training for border officers includes modules on risk assessment systems and procedures for reporting suspicious activity. When officers detect potential threats, reports are forwarded to local units for further investigation. Based on migration trends, Hungary plans to increase the number of officers stationed in other countries by 2026 to strengthen early detection and prevention of illegal entry.

185. During its on-site visit to the Röszke BCP, the delegation learned that automated checks are also performed against EIS, and the criminal police authority uses SIENA to follow up hits and communicate with other countries. Cross-border officers are trained in using the Common Risk Indicators to detect FTFs and profile cards, including of FTFs. The protocols in place enable the front-line officers, in cases of a suspicion of terrorism (or a terrorist suspect), to activate TEK to produce an assessment or to assist in the secondary checks/interviews. TEK has offices near the BCPs. If a known or suspected terrorist or FTF is apprehended at the border, the National Police have the power to make an arrest, but TEK provides support.

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***Biometrics***

193. In its resolution 2396 (2017), the Security Council requires Member States to develop and implement systems to collect biometric data to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including FTFs, in compliance with domestic law and international human rights law. States are also encouraged to share such data responsibly among relevant Member States, as appropriate, and with INTERPOL and other relevant international bodies.

194. At the time of the visit, biometric data were collected as part of the visa process; this included facial images and fingerprints from third country nationals. These data were then cross-checked and verified upon entry at the BCP. Hungary stated that once EES is fully implemented, travellers from third countries, both short-stay visa holders and visa-exempt travellers, would be registered by an automated IT system each time they cross a European Union external border. This system would register the person's name, the type of travel document, biometric data (fingerprints and captured facial images) and the date and place of entry and exit, in full respect for fundamental rights and data protection. The system would also record decisions to refuse entry.

195. Provisions enabling the collection of biometric data within asylum procedures are set out in Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum, in particular section 35, as well as paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 83. Within immigration procedures, the detailed rules on data processing are included under title 110 of Government Decree 35/2024 (II. 29.) on the implementation of Act XC of 2023 on the General Rules for the Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals.

196. Facial images are stored in the asylum records managed by the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing, while fingerprint data can be found in the national fingerprint database maintained by the Dactyloscopy Institute of the National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science.

197. To fully implement Security Council requirements, and for Hungary to fully benefit from using such data, ***the Committee recommends that Hungary extend biometric data collection at entry at borders from those who are apprehended attempting to enter Hungary between official BCPs. (priority recommendation 49)***. ***The Committee further recommends that the biometrics of individuals entering, departing, or seeking residence in Hungary be cross-checked against and compared with data from other relevant national and international databases to responsibly and properly identify terrorists, including FTFs.*** The Committee underlines the importance of implementing biometrics in a responsible manner, including adopting clear human rights-based frameworks for the use of biometric technology that include the use of procedural safeguards for and effective oversight of its application.

198. ***The Committee also encourages Hungary to enable sharing of biometric data among relevant Member States and to share such data (images, fingerprints and DNA samples) of suspected and convicted terrorists via INTERPOL channels and to systematically include biometrics linked to all terrorist profiles in INTERPOL data sets and alerts (recommendation 53).***

*Travel document security*

199. Hungary has issued ICAO-compliant electronic machine-readable travel documents (eMRTD) and implemented security features compliant with ICAO Document 9303 and European Union regulations ((EC) No. 2252/2004 on passports, (EU) 2019/1157 on identification cards). The Hungarian Ministry of Interior, Central Passport Department, is responsible for issuing Hungarian biometric passports. It regularly evaluates the security of Hungarian travel documents from multiple aspects. The renewal of the current passport is in progress. The Special Service for National Security supervises the protection of the production of travel documents. Blank passport booklets are stored and processed under strict security measures and their movements are continuously documented.

200. The application, assessment and issuance of an identity card is regulated in detail at the government decree level: Decree 414/2015 (XII. 23.) on the rules for issuing identity cards and the requirements for unified facial images and signatures. The life cycle of documents can be traced in the register of official identity cards from application to delivery to the customer.

201. Hungary is a long-time member of PKD, the central repository for exchanging the information required to authenticate eMRTDs such as e-passports, electronic identification cards and Visible Digital Seals. Hungary seems to be advanced in its use of the system. Hungary continuously uploads the public key of the Country Signing Certification Authority and document signer certificates to the PKD system via the national PKD system. As a result, the Hungarian master list is also kept updated. The Hungarian document signer certificates and the Hungarian master list are continuously available in the PKD system. In Hungary, the above-mentioned tasks are carried out by the Ministry of the Interior based on Government Decrees 101/1998 and 182/2022.

*Refugees and asylum*

202. Hungary’s migration and asylum system is managed through a coordinated structure involving four key law enforcement entities: TEK, the National Directorate-General for Aliens Policing (NDGAP), and the National Police. In 2019, the NDGAP was reintegrated into the law enforcement framework. While it does not operate directly at BCPs, it plays a critical role in conducting inspections, processing applications, and maintaining a migration network that supports all Hungarian agencies.

203. Asylum matters are handled by a centralized Asylum Directorate. Hungary currently operates three reception facilities for asylum-seekers, one of which functions as a detention centre. The year 2015 marked a peak in migration-related activity for all Hungarian law enforcement bodies, placing significant pressure on the system. A key challenge has been the tension between

the Schengen regulations, which emphasize strict border control, and the asylum framework, which requires a degree of openness and trust in applicants. This imbalance prompted the Hungarian legislature to adopt a more restrictive asylum policy to ensure that the national asylum system was able to respond to the situation.

204. The main legal framework includes Act XC of 2023 on the General Rules for the Entry and Residence of Third-Country Nationals, which outlines the rules for entry, stay, and residence permits for non-European Union citizens. Act No. LXXX of 2007, the Asylum Act (as amended), stipulates the content of the asylum granted by Hungary, the criteria for recognition as a refugee, who can be a beneficiary of subsidiary and temporary protection and a person with tolerated stay, and the procedure for expulsion by the asylum authority, as well as the recognition and the revocation thereof.

205. Act VI of 2018, which amended Hungary's Criminal Code, penalizes facilitation of illegal migration. According to Hungary, the law guarantees the right tools to fight the people who help unauthorized persons submit falsified applications for asylum and to respond to the border protection challenges presented by the influx of migrants. Hungary explained that a person can only commit the crime intentionally and intent is established through a personalized interview that also covers current and prior relations with support from national security and TEK.

206. Under the legal framework, and as a general rule, asylum applications can only be submitted after a declaration of intent is filed in a third country, specifically Serbia or Ukraine, as indicated by Hungary. This policy shift has led to a dramatic reduction in asylum applications, with only 60 submitted in Hungary compared with 2.1 million across the European Union. The restructuring was designed to mitigate potential terrorist threats while ensuring that all legal applications remain aligned with the European Union asylum acquis.

207. National security and counter-terrorism authorities are involved in the asylum process. TEK and other national security bodies conduct binding risk assessments for each application. Although background checks are standard, they are often limited in cases where asylum-seekers lack documentation. In such instances, Hungary relies on the Eurodac system to verify identity and previous asylum claims within the European Union. The Hungarian asylum authority is responsible for issuing asylum passports and conducting background checks for family reunification cases. These checks are periodically renewed to ensure continued compliance with security standards.

***Aviation security***

208. Section 320 of the Criminal Code criminalizes acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation. The delegation noted that Hungary's legislative framework is established under Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security and repealing Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002. Hungary's primary aviation security legislation is Government Decree 169/2010 (V.11.) on the rules for the security of civil aviation and the Aviation Security Committee and its powers, duties and procedures of operation. Act CLVII of 2020 ratifies bilateral air transport

agreements, incorporating provisions related to aviation security and reaffirming Hungary's commitment to international conventions.

209. Government Decree 169/2010 (V.11.), last amended in 2012, designates the National Transport Authority of Hungary (NTA) the governing body for various transport sectors, including aviation. Under the NTA, the Aviation Authority is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of the NCASP, as well as for the establishment of the legal basis for the organization of the aviation security system. Hungary has established a National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme (NCAQCP) and a National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme, which were both amended in 2024.

210. The National Civil Aviation Security Committee (NCASC), established by Government Decree 169/2010, coordinates security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary ensure the proper functioning of NCASC for the purpose of coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, including airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities concerned with, or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of NCASP (recommendation 54)***. ***Hungary is further encouraged to ensure that entities responsible for the implementation of various aspects of NCASP be systematically invited to attend its meetings when issues related to the implementation of aspects of NCASP (for example, security measures at Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport) (recommendation 55).***

211. Government Decree 169/2010, article 22, requires that an Airport Security Committee at each airport assist the coordinating authority in its role coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in the Airport Security Programme.

212. The National Air Transport Facilitation Programme was amended in 2023. It includes the establishment of the National Air Transport Facilitation Committee and defines the responsibilities of its members, as required in annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

213. Hungary's civil aviation security oversight is established in line with annex II to European Union regulation No. 2008/300, as well NCAQCP. The Aviation Authority is responsible for the implementation of the oversight system.

214. The Aviation Authority consists of 76 aviation security inspectors. According to NCAQCP, the Aviation Authority ensures that auditors regularly participate in training at such a periodicity that they can maintain their existing competence and acquire new competence related to changes in the field of aviation security. National auditors are authorized by the Aviation Authority to perform compliance monitoring activities, to obtain the information necessary to carry out their tasks and to require any identified deficiency to be rectified within set time frames. The delegation was informed that the Aviation Security Unit conducts quality control activities (including audits, inspections and tests).

215. The delegation also noted that security screener and aviation security instructor certification requirements are established in chapter 11 of Commission Regulation (EU) No.

185/2010 of 4 March 2010. In Hungary, the Aviation Authority and the airport police are involved in the certification of security screeners, inspectors and aviation security instructors. In order to protect aviation, standard or enhanced security background checks are carried out in accordance with Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1998.

216. Government Decree 169/2010 (V.11 of 1 January 2022) establishes that the Aviation Authority assesses risks affecting civil aviation in an ongoing manner and determines the threat level, develops procedures, informs cooperating authorities and requests action if necessary. The same Decree also assigns the police, among other things, the power to conduct a risk analysis of potentially disruptive passengers and inform the airline about such passengers, as well as to carry out a risk analysis of persons turned back owing to refusal of entry.

217. TEK is designated to continuously assesses the level of terrorist threat to civil aviation, determine the terrorist threat and take the necessary measures with the cooperating authorities to protect aircraft and airport facilities that are at risk of terrorism or are under threat of terrorism. The Constitution Protection Office assesses the level of all other threats to civil aviation.

218. During the visit, it was not clear to the delegation what risk assessment methodology was being applied or whether there was a risk register containing a list of threat scenarios and their corresponding threat, consequence, and vulnerability assessments and resulting risks. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to streamline processes to establish a methodology for risk assessment at national and sector-specific levels, in particular to ensure that there is an appropriate risk assessment methodology available and in use for adjusting relevant elements of the security measures established in NCASP (recommendation 56).***

219. In 2024, Hungary established a programme to mitigate possible attacks against aircraft by man-portable air defence systems and other weapons representing a similar threat to aircraft at or near an airport. During this initial phase, the programme is reviewed every three months. ***The Committee encourages Hungary, as part of the programme, to establish a requirement to ensure that, in accordance with the risk assessment of the relevant national or local authorities, appropriate measures on the ground or operational procedures are established to mitigate possible attacks against aircraft by man-portable air defence systems and other weapons representing a similar threat to aircraft at or near an airport (recommendation 57).***

220. With regard to the sharing of threat information between States, Hungary is a member of EASA and operates a platform for the rapid exchange of information on conflict zones worldwide. In addition, Hungary has representatives from the Ministry of Construction and Transport and the Ministry of Interior in the risk assessment working group jointly operated by the European Union's Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport and Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, which rapidly shares threat information as well as information among law enforcement agencies using a common information exchange system.

221. Cybersecurity is handled by all relevant authorities involved in aviation security. The National Security Service supports the relevant authorities and organizations involved in aviation security with current, relevant information on threats and risks, including cyber-risks, in order to enable them to carry out appropriate risk analyses for the performance of their tasks. Organizations

involved in aviation security are required to develop a regulatory system for the security of the IT system used to perform their activities (cybersecurity measures).

222. The delegation visited Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport. The airport is operated by Budapest Airport Ltd. The delegation was informed that surveillance, patrolling and other physical checks on the airport area are carried out by armed security guards of the airport operator. The 37 km perimeter fence is connected to an alarm system and 1,600 closed-circuit television cameras. Airport screening equipment is all European Union approved (passenger screening, hold baggage screening).

223. The airport operator carries out aviation security controls at the airport, under the supervision of the airport police. If there is suspicion of a prohibited item, the airport operator calls the passenger by all available means within the airport's infrastructure and the checked baggage may be opened in the passenger's presence. In the absence of a passenger, the checked baggage may be opened by a person authorized to screen checked baggage in the presence of a police officer who is authorized to do so.

224. The airport operator, the airline, the air traffic control service, and other legal entities are required to record their procedures for preventing an anticipated or actual unlawful act against air traffic or for preventing an attempt to do so, in the Emergency Plan, which must include the activities of the given organization in an emergency and its cooperation with the airport services. The exercise of the tasks included in the Emergency Plan and the evaluation of the results must be carried out annually in the case of commercial airports with passenger traffic exceeding 2 million passengers, and every two years in the case of commercial airports with less than this in passenger traffic. Hungary has developed a National Contingency Plan, and such plans have been developed at the airport level. The most recent emergency exercise was conducted in 2024 covering an unlawful interference complex scenario. As communicated to the delegation, lessons learned from the exercise revealed that the communication between the participating agencies during an emergency needs to be improved.

***Processing of goods***

225. NTCA conducts investigations and takes measures to detect criminal activities, including the recovery of criminal assets. It does not currently have direct access to INTERPOL databases via the I-24/7 system. Instead, information is shared through the Hungarian liaison officer stationed at Europol headquarters, who relays intelligence via SIENA. Customs authorities do not receive information about police searches or their outcomes. However, the legal transport of weapons is monitored through customs IT systems, which are used to verify and manage permits.

226. Customs patrols are active along Hungary's external border with Ukraine, where they utilize specialized equipment such as UAS and patrol boats, particularly in riverine areas. No patrols are conducted along the Serbian border due to the presence of a physical fence and a comprehensive surveillance system. According to authorities, the primary threat along this section is human trafficking.

227. Hungarian authorities have reported a continued flow of automatic weapons from Serbia, where large stockpiles remain accessible on the black market. These weapons are often trafficked

into Western Europe, where their value is significantly higher. Smugglers typically conceal firearms in passenger vehicles. NTCA has extensive experience in detecting such concealed cargo and shares detection methods and trends with officers on a weekly basis to ensure awareness of evolving smuggling techniques. In early 2025, Frontex conducted a training exercise at the Röszke border crossing, during which weapons were hidden in passenger traffic. Customs officers successfully identified all concealments, demonstrating the effectiveness of their risk-based approach. Once weapons are detected, customs officers are responsible for securing the area and detaining the individuals involved. The police then assume responsibility for the seizure, storage, and further processing of the weapons. However, customs authorities do not receive feedback on the tracing results of seized weapons, which limits their ability to refine risk analysis.

228. Detection of dual-use goods at BCPs is infrequent, typically occurring several times per month. When such items are identified, customs officers consult with the licensing authority in Budapest for guidance on further action. Officers also have access to licensing authorities in other countries to verify the authenticity of export licences. This technical reachback capability is considered good practice in managing sensitive dual-use transfers.

229. Röszke BCP also serves as a major hub for military-to-military transfers, including NATO exercises and United Nations missions. These transfers are regulated under a temporary export regime, which requires documentation of weapon types, quantities, and serial numbers to ensure their return to Hungary after deployment. Such transfers occur frequently – two to three times per day – and customs officers are well-versed in the procedures. Currently, automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) is not available at the Röszke BCP. However, given high volumes of passenger and cargo traffic, this technology could be highly beneficial for multiple purposes, including risk management, creation of vehicle location data, traffic management, etc. In terms of risk management, as all lorries are X-rayed and images are stored for many years, ANPR could serve as one of the variables to allow faster search through these images for pattern identification. Currently, number plate data is input manually, which can lead to human error. Despite the fact that data provided during the documentary check are cross-checked and corrected by an X-ray operator, still some mistakes may persist as the input is still manual. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to consider introducing automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) at all border-crossing points (recommendation 58).***

230. On the policy level, the BCPs are recognized as critical infrastructure of the State. Given a heavy reliance on IT software for the management of passenger and cargo flows at the BCPs, lack of robust cybersecurity may not only inhibit these daily tasks but also pose a risk to national security. Surveillance cameras may be either switched off or hacked or advanced cargo data may be spoofed to enable human and commodity trafficking by organized criminal and terrorist organizations. ***The Committee recommends Hungary review the cybersecurity protocols, introduce a practice of frequent drills and develop other cybersecurity measures to ensure that the system can withstand malicious attacks (recommendation 59).***

231. Intelligence exchange between NTCA and other government agencies seems to be rather limited. However, NTCA also possesses a lot of data that could be used for intelligence purposes. Trafficking in certain prohibited or restricted commodities across borders is one of the red flags for potential terrorist activity (in addition to organized crime), thus using the intelligence on goods in conjunction with watch listing, cash flow monitoring and other variables could provide a better intelligence picture. ***The Committee recommends Hungary explore ways to share and use***

***customs data for wider intelligence purposes and establish protocols enabling customs, security and intelligence agencies to better cooperate operationally on a regular basis (priority recommendation 50).***

232. During the visit to Budapest Ferenc Liszt International Airport, airport management pointed out that passenger traffic is constantly growing, with new international itineraries being added every year. There is also a plan to build a new terminal to accommodate new traffic. From this perspective, the ability of customs officials to make to watch-listing requests, and access to API/PNR is vital. Ideally this access would be provided by embedding a customs officer into PIU, which is currently managed by NIK. Current customs techniques will not be sufficient to cover ever-growing passenger flows. The use of API/PNR data has already proven its efficacy in allowing users to detect multiple offences, including bulk cash and gold smuggling, drugs and weapons smuggling, and smuggling of other restricted and prohibited commodities. Passenger risk assessment by customs officials through direct access to API/PNR, in addition to watch listing, use of open-source intelligence and standard customs risk analysis is highly recommended for border security purposes.

233. Currently NTCA does not station liaison officers abroad. The delegation discussed with the authorities the importance for Hungary to consider stationing customs liaison officers abroad, particularly in high-risk countries, to enhance bilateral intelligence exchange and operational coordination with other countries.

234. Hungary recognizes the SAFE Framework of Standards and has fully implemented the advance information for cargo and postal shipments. An authorized economic operator scheme is also functional. However, at the time of the visit, there was no single window system operating within Hungary. The delegation was informed that a legal initiative to support the development of the European Union Single Window Environment for Customs was being prepared. ***The Committee recommends Hungary establish a single window system for Customs (priority recommendation 51).***

## IV. National integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy

235. The Security Council has regularly encouraged Member States to consider developing comprehensive and integrated national counter-terrorism strategies and effective mechanisms to implement them that include attention to the conditions conducive to terrorism, in accordance with their obligations under international law. The delegation recalled that a national counter-terrorism strategy should be comprehensive, integrated and multidisciplinary by engaging a wide range of different stakeholders from both the governmental (e.g., ministries of interior, justice, education department/ministry, media/ministry of information, judiciary, etc.) and non-governmental sectors (e.g., the media, civil society, the private sector; faith-based organizations; religious leaders; women's groups; local stakeholders at provincial and/or municipal levels).

236. In 2015, the Hungarian Government re-established a Counter-Terrorism Committee by means of Decision 1824/2015 on the coherent implementation of counter-terrorism activities, which entered into force on 20 November 2015. In 2020, Hungary adopted a National Security

Strategy which recognizes, inter alia, the need for enhanced national coordination in the fight against terrorism. Hungary has, however, not put in place a national counter-terrorism strategy. The authorities stated that the development of such a strategy had not been prioritized owing to the low terrorism threat level in Hungary. ***Hungary is encouraged to consider developing a comprehensive and integrated national counter-terrorism strategy, or to expand its existing National Security Strategy with a view to ensuring that it is comprehensive and integrated. This process would benefit from involving a wide range of stakeholders in governmental (e.g. ministries of interior, justice, education department/ministry, media/ministry of information, judiciary, etc.) and non-governmental sectors (e.g. the media, civil society, the private sector; faith-based organizations; religious leaders; women's groups; local stakeholders at provincial and/or municipal levels). The new or expanded strategy should also address conditions conducive to terrorism and ensure that all counter-terrorism efforts adhere to Hungary's obligations under international law, including international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law (recommendation 60).***

## V. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) and the provisions of resolutions 2178 (2014) relevant to countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism

***Countering incitement to terrorism***

237. The Security Council, in paragraphs 1 and 3 of resolution 1624 (2005), calls upon all States to adopt measures to prohibit, by law, incitement to commit a terrorist act or acts. The Council has also consistently stressed that the fight against terrorism must be conducted consistently with international human rights law. In that context, it is important to find an appropriate balance between criminalizing speech that may incite a terrorist attack, while ensuring that genuine protest or dissent is not criminalized.

238. The offence of incitement to terrorism exists in Hungary's Criminal Code under section 331. However, the formulation of the offence gives rise to a fundamental legal issue in that there is no requirement for a direct and immediate connection between the accused's words or actions and the actual risk of a terrorist act being committed. This lack of causal link means that speech can effectively be criminalized even where it does not pose a real, demonstrable danger of inciting a terrorist act. This raises serious human rights concerns regarding freedom of expression, including the peaceful expression of political or religious views, criticism of State policy, or support for controversial causes, and risks undermining the necessary balance between effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of fundamental rights, as required by the Security Council and relevant international legal standards. While jurisprudence may help to clarify the requirement for a direct and immediate connection, defining the term more precisely in legislation would enhance legal certainty and reinforce necessary safeguards. ***Hungary is encouraged to include an express requirement for a "direct and immediate connection" between the incitement and the actual risk of a terrorist act being committed, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) (priority recommendation 5).***

239. Following the visit, Hungary provided additional information, stating that, under Section 12 of the Criminal Code, perpetrators include offenders, indirect offenders, and joint offenders, while instigators and abettors are classified as accessories. Section 14(1) defines an instigator as a person who intentionally induces another to commit an intentional criminal offence. The inducement must trigger the recipient's intent and at least an attempt to commit the offence, and the instigator must be aware that their conduct may produce this effect. These provisions establish a direct link between instigation and the risk of a terrorist act. In Addition, Hungary shared that Paragraph 331(2) of the Criminal Code aligns with Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism, which criminalizes public provocation to commit terrorist offences, including the distribution or making available of messages that glorify terrorism and create a real danger that such offences may be committed. The offence under Paragraph 331(2) requires intent and may be direct or incidental. The perpetrator must be aware that their conduct may reach an unpredictable audience and influence others to view terrorism positively.

Hungary concludes that speech is only criminalized if it poses a real, demonstrable risk of inciting a terrorist act. Political or religious expression, criticism of State policy, or support for controversial causes does not constitute this offence. The Committee takes note of the explanation provided and agrees that under Hungarian law, an instigator must be aware that their conduct may influence the perpetrator's decision. At the same time, criminalization must include both a subjective element (intent) and an objective element (creation of a real risk), ensuring proportionality and necessity. While Hungary's law satisfies the subjective element, it does not explicitly codify the "direct and immediate" link between inducement and the likelihood of a terrorist act. Reliance on judicial interpretation alone creates legal uncertainty and may lead to inconsistent application.

***Countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism***

240. While Hungary does not have in place a national strategy or action plan on countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism, it has a number of measures aimed at promoting tolerance, dialogue and human rights education, which contribute to preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism.

241. The delegation discussed with Hungary reports about a rise in hate crimes and Hungary's efforts to more effectively address them. In this regard, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination expressed its deep alarm at the prevalence of racist hate speech in Hungary against Roma, migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and other minorities, in particular by public figures who made statements that might promote racial hatred.[8] It is recommended that Hungary take all immediate measures to stop racist hate speech and incitement to violence, publicly condemn and distance itself from racist hate speech by public figures and strengthen and implement relevant legislation, and effectively identify, register, investigate and prosecute cases of racist hate speech or incitement to racial hatred and sanction those responsible. Other United Nations bodies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

[8] A/HRC/WG.6/39/HUN/2, para. 9.

noted similar concerns.[9] The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants noted that journalists from local media helped to fuel xenophobia and anti-migration attitude in the country and called upon the Government and politicians at all levels to refrain from advocacy of ethnic or racial hatred and xenophobia that constituted incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence.[10] The Human Rights Committee recommended that Hungary improve the reporting, investigation, prosecution and punishment of hate crimes and criminal hate speech, strengthen its efforts to eradicate stereotyping and discrimination against migrants, refugees, Jews and Roma and ensure that State officials responsible for discriminatory behaviour towards Roma and other minority groups were held accountable in all instances.[11] ***The Counter-Terrorism Committee recommends that Hungary take steps to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, fostering tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and creating an environment that is not conducive to incitement. In this regard, it is recommended that public discourse refrain from statements that stigmatize and securitize certain communities, in particular refugees and migrants (priority recommendation 61).***

242. The authorities stated that Hungary has made the fight against antisemitism a political priority and put in place a National Strategy against Antisemitism. Earlier this year, a special commissioner for coordinating Hungary's actions against antisemitism was appointed. Hungary also stated that an anti-racism action plan is currently being developed by the Prime Minister's Office in cooperation with other competent ministries. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to ensure that all types of racially, religiously or ethnically motivated hatred are actively addressed as an integral part of efforts to prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism (recommendation 67).*** In this regard, the delegation noted that United Nations human rights bodies have expressed concern about the prevalence of racist hate speech in Hungary against Roma, migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and other minorities. The delegation also emphasized the importance of addressing all forms of racially, religiously or ethnically motivated hatred, discrimination and intolerance, which can create the conditions conducive to terrorism and encourages Hungary to keep the Committee informed about progress in developing the anti-racism action plan.

243. While the Hungarian authorities stated that no right-wing groups classified as terrorist organizations were known to operate in Hungary, they acknowledged the existence of various extremist right-wing movements and the ability of these ideologies to inspire lone actors. Some human rights organizations have alleged that law enforcement is not sufficiently addressing hate crimes perpetrated by extreme right-wing actors. Hungary reported that, in accordance with the recommendation of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights a protocol-based norm was issued in 2019 to provide uniform, effective and professional law enforcement responses to hate crimes.[12] ***The Committee would welcome further information on the implementation of the protocol and any related training that is being provided to law enforcement to ensure professional, effective and prejudice-free policing. The Committee recommends that Hungary ensure continued monitoring and appropriate responses to the threat posed by terrorism on the***

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[9] Cited in ibid.
[10] A/HRC/44/42/Add.1, para. 5 and para. 70.
[11] A/HRC/WG.6/39/HUN/2, para. 9.
[12] A/HRC/WG.6/39/HUN/1, para. 86.

***basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion and belief, while respecting freedom of expression and association (recommendation 68)***

244. Hungary highlighted concerns about the growing trend of child and youth radicalization, especially online. The Ministry of Youth is in the process of developing a new National Youth Strategy, while also implementing programmes under the European Union Youth Strategy. A range of initiatives are in place to promote digital literacy, mental health and critical thinking skills among youth. ***The Committee encourages Hungary to take further steps to prevent child and youth radicalization online while safeguarding children's rights (recommendation 69).***

245. Hungary adopted, in December 2023, national legislation to implement the European Union Digital Services Act, aimed at preventing illegal and harmful activities online. Hungary provided additional information on the process to request the removal of harmful online content. The authorities stated that, based on the provisions of Act C of 2003 on Electronic Communications, the National Media and Info Communications Authority (NMHH) maintains an online information and assistance service for the protection of minors, which aims to curb violent, inflammatory or otherwise abusive Internet content. On this platform, users can report content they consider harmful, which will then be investigated by NMHH. If the report indicates the possibility of a criminal offence falling within the competence of TEK, NMHH forwards the report to TEK, as the competent authority in the matter, within one working day of the detection. If TEK determines that the content in question is related to terrorism, NMHH will issue an order in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/784 on action against the dissemination of terrorist content online, which will be sent directly to the service provider operating the content. The content must be removed within 24 hours. Hungary further stated that, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/784, NMHH's removal order must provide justification for classifying the material to be removed or made inaccessible as terrorist content. It must also include sufficient information to identify the location of the content, including the exact URL, and any other necessary details. The delegation stressed the need to ensure that any measures taken to address incitement to terrorism and potential misuse of the Internet and other information and communications technologies by terrorist groups complied with Hungary's obligations under international law, including the need to ensure respect for the right to freedom of expression, in accordance with Council resolution 1624 (2005).

***Role of civil society in preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism***

246. The Security Council has repeatedly recognized the importance of engagement with civil society entities, including community-based civil society, youth, women, and cultural, educational, and religious leaders, in preventing and countering terrorism, increasing awareness about the threats of terrorism, and effective ways of tackling them.

247. The shrinking civic space in Hungary is a major concern that has been highlighted by United Nations human rights bodies and that the delegation raised in its discussions with the Hungarian authorities. The delegation also had the valuable opportunity to hear directly from representatives of CSOs.

248. CSOs highlighted the importance of mutual trust and regular engagement between civil society and the Government and stressed that the absence of such engagement can be detrimental to national security. They described the prevailing government narrative as one portraying CSOs as "pawns" of external actors who bring "terrorism" to Hungary. Such a framing, in their view, makes it almost impossible for civil society to engage with the Government in a constructive way.

249. The CSOs provided multiple examples of restrictions on their activities. They described a series of successive laws which have severely limited their ability to operate freely and to secure funding. This included the following:

- The so-called "Stop Soros" law package, adopted in June 2018, introduced measures to sanction individuals and organizations supporting the arrival or stay of asylum applicants and refugees in Hungary. These measures include amendments to the Penal Code introducing a stand-alone criminal offence against the public order entitled "facilitating, supporting unlawful migration" and criminalizing, inter alia, "organized" activities aiming at the initiation of an asylum procedure that can be sanctioned with detention and up to one year of imprisonment and banishment;[13]

- Act LXXXVIII of December 2023 on the Protection of National Sovereignty. The Act establishes a new Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) and introduces sanctions within the Criminal Code for using prohibited foreign funds with up to three years of imprisonment. SPO is bestowed with expansive investigative powers and the right to release a public report about the findings of its investigations. No effective legal remedies are available against SPO's actions, including against its investigations or the publication of its findings. SPO has very broad powers to request information or data from the subjects of its investigations who cannot challenge this;[14]

- The draft legislation on the "Transparency of Public Life" that is currently pending approval by parliament. If adopted, the law would make it mandatory for NTCA and credit institutions to scrutinize every foreign funding transaction based on whether they anticipate the funding will be used to "influence public life." It would also permit credit institutions to transfer foreign funding to the State-owned National Cooperation Fund. Managers of "excluded organizations" would fall under the category of "politically exposed persons" subjecting them to AML and CTF laws without providing any procedural safeguards and without a clear, evidence-based risk analysis.

250. The CSOs emphasized that these laws impose burdensome and restrictive conditions on CSOs receiving foreign funding and that they are incompatible with international human rights law, notably the freedom of expression and association, the right to respect for private life, the

[13] The Human Rights Committee noted with concern the serious restrictions of this legislative package on the operations of CSOs and on critics of the Government's immigration policy. The Human Rights Committee was concerned that the package risks stigmatizing non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and curbing their ability to carry out their activities in support of human rights, particularly the rights of refugees, asylum-seekers and migrants. The Human Rights Committee was also concerned that the imposition of restrictions on foreign funding directed to NGOs may be used to apply illegitimate pressure on them and to interfere unjustifiably with their activities. See A/HRC/WG.6/39/HUN/2, para. 54.

[14] See Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, letter dated 8 December 2023, available at https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=28661.

right to a fair trial and the prohibition of discrimination. They also noted that these cumbersome procedures divert time, resources and attention from the “real” work of these organizations, in particular (though not limited to) those who assist refugees and asylum-seekers.

251. The CSOs expressed their deep concern about the securitization of migration. They echoed the concerns raised by United Nations human rights bodies regarding Hungary’s asylum laws. They also highlighted the practice of collective expulsions since 2016, which constitutes a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of foreigners under the European Convention on Human Rights. The CSOs emphasized that such practices not only violate fundamental human rights but are also counterproductive as they can force refugees into the hands of illegal smugglers. ***The Counter-Terrorism Committee recommends that Hungary strengthen its engagement with civil society and ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place to enable CSOs that provide legitimate humanitarian assistance, legal advice, or other support to refugees and migrant communities to carry out their work (priority recommendation 62).***

252. The CSOs also detailed instances of intrusive surveillance methods being used against civil society actors and laid out the detrimental effects this has had on them personally, their organizations, and in some cases their family members. In this regard, they highlighted the lack of effective legal remedies and the lack of independence of the judicial system. They emphasized that these concerns had already been addressed in relevant jurisdictions of European courts, but that implementation of the judgments was severely lagging.[15]

253. The delegation conveyed to the authorities the messages from civil society regarding the latter’s willingness and desire for constructive engagement with the Government, especially on matters that can impact national security. The delegation highlighted throughout the discussions with the authorities that counter-terrorism and respect for international law, including international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, are mutually reinforcing. The delegation also highlighted the Security Council’s provisions regarding the important contribution of civil society to preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism as part of a whole-of-society effort. ***The Committee strongly recommends that Hungary ensure that no undue restrictions are placed on civil society with regard to exercising their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association (priority recommendation 63).***

### *Role of women and gender in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism*

254. The delegation recalled that in resolution 2242 (2015), the Security Council called for the greater integration by Member States and the United Nations of their agendas on women, peace and security, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism and requested the Committee and CTED to integrate gender as a cross-cutting issue throughout the activities within their respective mandates, including within country-specific assessments and reports.

[15] See A/HRC/WG.6/39/HUN/3, para. 24.

255. Hungary has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. Hungary does not have in place a national action plan for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

256. Hungary provided the delegation with statistics on the participation of women in law enforcement and the security sector. While Hungary has made important progress in increasing women's participation in national security institutions (e.g., Hungary has the highest proportion of female active-duty soldiers among NATO allies), the number of women in senior positions in law enforcement remains low.

257. The intelligence services informed the delegation that, as part of its monitoring of trends in the online threat landscape, Hungary is aware of reports of misogynistic hate speech and incel content which has been linked to terrorist attacks in other countries. They noted, however, that there had been no incel cases in Hungary. The delegation encouraged Hungary to continue to monitor such trends, with the requisite human rights safeguards in place, so as to ensure that a gender analysis is fully integrated into Hungary's assessment of the terrorist threat and its drivers. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary consider adopting a national action plan on women, peace and security that includes provisions related to gender-sensitive approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism, in line with the Council's call in resolution 2242 (2015) to integrate the women, peace and security and counter-terrorism agendas (recommendation 72).***

## VI. Human rights in the context of counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism

258. In accordance with its mandate and the practice followed for the Committee's visits, the delegation raised human rights issues throughout its discussions with the Government of Hungary. The delegation underscored the need to ensure that any measures taken to prevent and counter terrorism comply with Hungary's obligations pursuant to international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.

259. Hungary is a State Party to seven of the nine core international human rights instruments. It is not a party to the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance or the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

260. The Office of the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights (CFR) is the national human rights institution of Hungary. Its mandate is enshrined in article 30 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary and Act CXI of 2011 on the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, both of which entered into force on 1 January 2012. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is elected for six years, renewable once with the votes of two thirds of the members of the National Assembly (parliament) based on a proposal of the President of Hungary. The deputies are selected by the Commissioner and approved by the parliament.

261. While initially accrediting CFR with an "A status" for compliance with the principles relating to the status of national institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights (the Paris Principles), the Subcommittee on Accreditation of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions recommended, in 2022, to downgrade the accreditation to a "B status."[16] According to the Subcommittee on Accreditation, CFR has not substantiated that it is fulfilling its mandate to effectively promote and protect all human rights, including in relation to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, LGBTQI+ persons, human rights defenders, and refugees, or the rights related to key human rights issues, such as media pluralism, civic space and judicial independence. It has also not received sufficient evidence on its engagement with the Constitutional Court and international human rights mechanisms in relation to cases deemed political and institutional. CFR has challenged this assessment.

262. The delegation had the opportunity to meet with CFR to discuss key human rights issues in the context of preventing and countering terrorism in Hungary, as well as concerns raised by United Nations human rights mechanisms with regard to CFR's independent oversight functions and its effectiveness in addressing the full range of human rights issues, including in relation to vulnerable groups such as ethnic minorities, and refugees. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary continue its dialogue with the relevant United Nations human rights bodies to address the concerns raised and take further steps to strengthen the independence and effective oversight functions of CFR (recommendation 70).***

263. The delegation noted the serious concerns raised by United Nations human rights mechanisms regarding the shrinking civic space in Hungary. In this regard, the delegation also noted concerns about the draft law on the "Transparency of Public Life" and its potential adverse effect on the legitimate activities of CSOs and their funding. The delegation highlighted in this regard the requirements of resolution 2462 (2019) and FATF recommendation 8. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary continue its dialogue with United Nations human rights mechanisms to address the concerns raised with regard to civil society's ability to exercise its rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, and to keep the Committee informed of progress in this regard (recommendation 71).***

264. With regard to refugees and asylum, the Committee notes that UNHCR has criticized the 2018 amendments to the Asylum Act as inconsistent with Hungary's obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention and notes that measures taken to implement counter-terrorism resolutions adopted by the Security Council need to be consistent with international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.[17] The authorities confirmed that the legislative provisions under Act LXXXIX of 2007 on the State Border, specifically sections 5(1a) and (1b), as well as additional legislative amendments introduced in 2017 to tighten procedures conducted in the border surveillance area, remain in force. These provisions allow police to return third-country nationals found to be irregularly present to the nearest border gate during a declared "crisis situation caused by mass immigration". The Government also stated that, as a general rule, including few exemptions categories, asylum-seekers are required to submit a "declaration of intent" at the Hungarian embassies in Belgrade or Kyiv before they may request international protection.

[16] The "B status" indicates that the national human rights institution is not fully in compliance with the Paris Principles or insufficient information was provided to make a determination.
[17] UNHCR, UNHCR Observations on the Legislative Amendments Adopted in Hungary in June and July 2018, 6 November 2018.

According to the Government, decisions on whether to grant a single-entry permit are based on whether the applicant's reasons relate to the 1951 Refugee Convention and whether they have already found protection in another country. Applicants have no right to appeal a refusal. Hungary further stated that the 2018 inadmissibility provision based on the safe third-country concept has been repealed and that current procedures follow Hungary's national implementation of relevant European Union directives.[18] ***The Committee recommends that Hungary continue its dialogue with United Nations human rights mechanisms and ensure that all decisions to return asylum-seekers to third countries are consistent with the 1951 Refugee Convention. Specifically, the relevant authorities must be satisfied that in any third country the person will not be at risk of persecution, serious harm or refoulement and that the possibility exists to request and receive refugee status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention (<u>priority recommendation 64</u>).***

265. In 2016, Hungary declared a crisis situation due to mass immigration and activated a peacetime crisis response mechanism under Act LXXX of 2007 on Asylum (Asylum Act). The Government may declare such a crisis by decree, valid for six months and renewable on the proposal of the Minister responsible for Aliens and Asylum. The decree remains valid for up to six months and may be extended by the Government based on assessments by the National Police Chief and the Head of the Asylum Authority, taking into account migration trends and associated security risks. The current decree, renewed in March 2025, remains in effect until September 2025 and allows for the implementation of specific administrative measures. These measures include temporary procedural changes such as modified asylum processing, enhanced border monitoring, and the deployment of law enforcement and defence personnel. Although Hungary affirms that this framework does not constitute a derogation from its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it does enable exceptional handling of asylum cases. Affected individuals retain access to judicial review, legal representation, interpretation, and the right to be informed of the reasons behind a decision. Parliament provides indirect oversight, with the power to amend the legal framework governing the crisis response.

266. The Standing Committee of the Parliament plays a key role, regularly hearing from the Minister of the Interior and other officials and may propose legal amendments. Oversight is provided by the Constitutional Court, which can annul unconstitutional decrees; the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, who monitors potential rights violations; and the State Audit Office, which reviews the use of public funds under the crisis designation. It is essential that such designations remain necessary, proportionate, and time-bound in line with Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 2178 (2014), and 2396 (2017), in which the Council urges States to strengthen border security while complying with their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. ***The Committee recommends that Hungary maintain an open and constructive dialogue with relevant United Nations human rights mechanisms with a view to ensuring transparency, safeguarding fundamental rights, and promoting trust in the legal***

[18] In June 2018, Hungary had introduced a new inadmissibility ground for rejecting asylum applications whereby a non-Hungarian citizen arriving to the territory of Hungary through a country where he or she was not exposed to persecution, or a direct risk of persecution would not be entitled to asylum (article XIV (4) of the Fundamental Act and section 51(2)(f) of Act LXXX on Asylum (Asylum Act). The Court of Justice of the European Union found this provision to be in violation of European Union law. Following the visit, the authorities shared that Hungary had removed the objectionable provisions from the law and referred to Act LXXX of 2007 on asylum, Section 51(1)(f))

***framework and criteria used to justify the continued designation of a crisis situation caused by mass immigration (priority recommendation 65).***

267. With regard to the offence introduced under section 353/A of the Criminal Code by Act VI of 2018, which criminalizes the facilitation of "illegal migration", the Government reported that only three cases have been examined to date, all of which were closed without prosecution. The authorities stated that while no consistent practice has developed yet, the three cases indicate that "the investigative authorities issue their decisions based on the rules of criminal procedure and a careful assessment of the legally relevant information." The delegation takes note of the information provided. The delegation also notes that the offence remains worded in broad terms that do not list exhaustively the prohibited practices and do not explicitly exclude from criminalization the provision of legitimate assistance to refugees and asylum-seekers. ***The Committee thus reiterates its recommendation that Hungary ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place to enable CSOs to provide legitimate humanitarian assistance, legal advice, or other support to refugees and migrant communities (priority recommendation 66).***

268. Hungary has taken steps towards ensuring adequate multisectoral support and assistance for victims of crime. While there are no specific provisions for victims of terrorism, they would be covered under the existing provisions. Victims of "intentional violent crimes" are entitled to State compensation, and this would apply to victims of terrorism. In 2020, the Victim Support Act was amended, establishing a victim support system based on direct contact with victims. The available support rests on three pillars: regional victim support services, victim support centres and the victim support hotline. The delegation had the opportunity to visit one of the victim support centres and hear from its dedicated staff. The delegation welcomed existing plans for the expansion of the network of victim support centres to cover all regions of the country by 2026.

## VII. Recommendations concerning steps that Hungary should take in order to fully implement the relevant provisions of resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017)

269. The Committee recommends that Hungary take the following actions:

***Counter-terrorism legislation and judicial practice***

***PRIORITY ACTION RECOMMENDED:***

**1. Review the provisions of its Criminal Code on terrorist offences, notably Section 314, to remove elements that are overly broad and vague to ensure that only violent acts committed with terrorist intent are criminalized.**

**2. Review its Criminal Code to ensure that all terrorist offences include a clear outcome element such as the requirement that the act cause, or be likely to cause, death, serious injury, or substantial damage to property in line with the threshold of seriousness established in the international counter-terrorism instruments.**

**3. Include an express provision requiring the refusal of extradition or mutual legal assistance where there are substantial grounds to believe that the request has been made for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing an individual on account of their race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, or political opinion.**
**4. Introduce an explicit exclusion of terrorism offences from offences of a political nature for which extradition and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters may be refused.**
**5. Include an express requirement for a "direct and immediate connection" between the incitement and the actual risk of a terrorist act being committed, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1624 (2005).**

6. Actively manage the process of becoming a party to the four remaining international counter-terrorism instruments.
7. Review section 314 of the Criminal Code to include the acts specific in articles 2(a) and (c) of the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.
8. Consider further aligning its legal framework on pretrial detention with international human rights standards to ensure that detention remains strictly necessary, proportionate, and subject to effective judicial oversight.
9. Examine its current legislative framework to ensure that it can adequately respond to the evolving landscape of technology-enabled counter-terrorism offences. A specific focus is recommended on enhancing the lawful, secure, and effective collection of electronic evidence in terrorism cases, especially in cases involving cross-border data access or transfer.
10. Strengthen the safeguards for the use of special investigative techniques as authorized under the National Security Act, in particular to include authorization by an independent judicial body and implementing proper safeguards for scope, duration, necessity and proportionality, as well as redress mechanisms.
11. Publish its national extradition procedures on the website of Hungary's national central authority, and submit the information to the UNODC secretariat, for inclusion in its repository database.
12. Expressly codify the principle of *aut dedere aut judicare* in its domestic law. This would ensure that all elements of the principle as required in the international counter-terrorism instruments are covered.
13. Strengthen implementation of the Protocols to the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants, and Trafficking in Firearms.
14. Enhance the application of complementary instruments, including the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, and the three International Drug Control Conventions, to address risks of the nexus of terrorism and organized crime.

***Countering the financing of terrorism***

***PRIORITY ACTION RECOMMENDED***
**15. Continue and accelerate its work on risk-based regulation and supervision of all types of VASPs, as well as assessing and addressing risks related to other emerging payment and fundraising methods, including crowdfunding, as per paragraph 20 of resolution of resolution 2462 (2019).**
**16. Actively manage the implementation of the newly adopted national listing process which introduced a domestic mechanism, implementing the asset-freezing requirements in resolution 1373 (2001).**

**17. Conduct a thorough risk assessment of its NPO sector and review the enhanced CFT measures currently in place in relation to all NPOs (public associations and religious organizations) operating in the country, to ensure that such measures are focused, proportionate and risk-based; apply only to subsets of NPOs that are identified as particularly vulnerable to terrorism-financing risks; and do not unduly disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activities, as required in resolution 2462 (2019).**

18. Further extend the array of stakeholders it consults on evolving TF risks, including representatives of the private sector that are not subject to AML/CFT reporting obligations but may be vulnerable to TF, including research and academia, the non-profit organization (NPO) sector and civil society.

19. In the course of the ongoing update of the 2022 NRA, consider extending the terrorism-financing risk analysis to economic sectors beyond those represented by reporting entities, including non-financial services, which can be vulnerable to terrorism financing, in line with paragraph 14 of resolution 2462 (2019).

20. Reflect on the evolving terrorism-financing risks and threats in the context of multifaceted and diverse regional and global trends, including the increasing use of digital methods to raise and transfer funds across borders.

21. Enhance its capacity to investigate and prosecute terrorism financing, notably through inter-agency trainings specific to national procedures.

22. Introduce a clear legal basis for mandatory parallel investigations and establish policies or standard operating procedures to ensure that relevant financial flows are considered in every terrorism investigation, including in relation to FTFs.

23. Continue enhancing the capacity of its relevant agencies, including the Customs Committee, to prevent, detect and suspend the use of cash couriers to move funds for TF purposes, including through proactive inter-agency coordination, the development of TF-specific risk indicators, and the use of consolidated designation lists at customs controls.

24. Consider giving customs officials powers to detain currency or bearer negotiable instruments where there is a suspicion of involvement in money-laundering or terrorism financing, or where a false declaration or no declaration has been made.

25. Establish systematic information exchange between the NTCA and FIU, especially regarding cash seizures, investigations and potential or confirmed links to TF offences.

26. Increase real-time cooperation between customs and border officials and law enforcement agencies in order to better assist customs and border officials to identify persons who may be cash couriers and identify potential ties to terrorism financing.

27. Develop procedures to formally notify listed individuals and entities of their designation as soon as possible after it has taken effect, to inform of them of (a) the designation and its implications, and unclassified information concerning the summary reasons for designation; (b) the review procedure and information on the delisting process, including a contact point within the Government to address any questions regarding the process; (c) publicly releasable information concerning the reasons for designation; and (d) procedures to allow licensed access to funds or other assets, for basic and extraordinary expenses as soon as possible. In addition, Hungary is encouraged to stipulate a periodic review of existing designations and freezing measures, in the

absence of petitions, to make sure that the grounds for maintaining the measures continue to exist and, if not, delist and unfreeze.

28. Continue efforts to raise awareness of its financial institutions on good practices and decrease de-risking practices in relation to the NPO sector.

29. Continue its efforts to raise awareness of its NPO sector regarding the risks of it being abused for TF purposes, in close consultation with the sector and relevant financial institutions.

30. Review the Law on the Transparency of Organizations Receiving Support from Abroad (Law LXXVI 2017).

31. Update its assessment of TF risks in relation to its NPOs to ensure a risk-based approach as required by the recent revisions to FATF recommendation 8, its interpretative note and best practice paper.

32. Establish consultation mechanism for the government, donors, financial institutions, NPOs and humanitarian actors to improve their common understanding of terrorism financing risks and of the possible impact of CFT measures on exclusively humanitarian activities and compliance with international human rights law and IHL.

33. Assess linkages between organized crime (including drug and human trafficking) and terrorism financing as part of the ongoing update of the NRA and ensure that proactive investigations into such linkages are regularly conducted when investigating new cases of organized crime (including illicit drugs and weapons trade).

34. Analyse any gender-specific implications with respect to terrorism-financing trends and measures in place to counter them (including but not limited to NPOs, financial inclusion, and links between human trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and terrorism financing, etc.).

***Law enforcement***

35. Continue efforts to ensure that terrorism-related information is disseminated in a timely and systematic manner to all relevant authorities with mandates and tasks in implementing counter-terrorism-related measures.

***PRIORITY ACTION RECOMMENDED***

**36. Supplement its threat assessment measures with vulnerability assessments and consideration of existing mitigation measures to enable a more comprehensive national risk management process and ensure that a comprehensive national risk assessment be disseminated to all relevant authorities with responsibilities in counter-terrorism.**

**37. Develop or transform the existing database(s) into a national integrated unclassified watch list or database and establish a legal framework that provides for nomination criteria by category, thresholds and differentiation between watch-listed individuals based on the identified threat they pose to national security.**

**38. Extend access to the INTERPOL I-24/7 system beyond the NCB to all strategic locations, including the airport and border-crossing points.**

39. Ensure, including with ongoing review, that its legal framework allowing for secret surveillance for security purposes is consistent with the principles of legality, proportionality, and necessity and that effective and independent oversight mechanisms are in place.
40. Continue its established cooperation level, further develop international cooperation efforts on counter-terrorism and maintain close engagement with its international partners, to enhance its capacity to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism in Europe and beyond.
41. Strengthen the institution of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights by ensuring that public organs respond or follow up to the Commissioners' recommendations and that effective mechanisms for remedies are put in place for the individuals whose rights have been violated.
42. Consider engagement with civil society groups in order to better address and incorporate their concerns and suggestions in developing accountable and transparent watch-listing practices.
43. Explore ways to enable the cross-checking of biometric data and advance passenger information (API)/passenger name records (PNR) data, to support identity verification of watch-listed individuals. The Committee also encourages Hungary to enable sharing that information through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms.
44. Systematically populate relevant INTERPOL databases and conduct more searches, including in biometrics databases (INTERPOL Facial Recognition System (IFRS), Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), and DNA), and increase biometric data flow (images, fingerprints and DNA samples) of suspected and convicted terrorists via INTERPOL channels and systematic inclusion of biometrics linked to all terrorist profiles in INTERPOL data sets and alerts
45. Make full use of the INTERPOL Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System (iARMS) and Ballistic Information Network.
46. Ensure that the outcomes of the investigations conducted by the police into the origin and intended destination of intercepted firearms are communicated to customs authorities, particularly when there is a potential link to terrorism. Such feedback supports NTCA's risk analysis and enhances operational awareness, contributing to more effective border security and counter-terrorism measures.
47. Ensure that the national recordkeeping system(s) allow for interconnectivity with iARMS to enable the relevant authorities to record illicit firearms therein and search seized firearms to determine whether they have been reported as lost, stolen, trafficked, or smuggled.

***Border management***

| ***PRIORITY ACTION RECOMMENDED*** |
| --- |
| [redacted] |
| **49. Extend biometric data collection at entry at borders from those who are apprehended attempting to enter Hungary between official border-crossing points.** |

**50. Explore ways to share and use customs data for wider intelligence purposes and establish protocols enabling customs, security and intelligence agencies to better cooperate operationally on a regular basis.**
**51. Establish a Single Window system for Customs.**

[redacted]

53. Share biometric data flow (images, fingerprints and DNA samples) of suspected and convicted terrorists via INTERPOL channels and systematically include biometrics linked to all terrorist profiles in INTERPOL data sets and alerts.
54. Ensure the proper functioning of NCASC for the purpose of coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, including airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service providers and other entities concerned with, or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of NCASP.
55. Ensure that entities responsible for the implementation of various aspects of NCASP be systematically invited to attend its meetings when issues related to the implementation of aspects of NCASP.
56. Streamline processes to establish a methodology for risk assessment at national and sector-specific levels, in particular to ensure that there is an appropriate risk assessment methodology available and in use for adjusting relevant elements of the security measures established in NCASP.
57. Establish a requirement to ensure that, in accordance with the risk assessment of the relevant national or local authorities, appropriate measures on the ground or operational procedures are established to mitigate possible attacks against aircraft by man-portable air defence systems and other weapons representing a similar threat to aircraft at or near an airport.
58. Consider introducing automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) at all border-crossing points.
59. Consider review the cybersecurity protocols and other cybersecurity measures and institute more frequent drills to ensure that the information technology infrastructure can withstand malicious attacks.

***National integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy***

60. Consider developing a comprehensive and integrated national counter-terrorism strategy, or to expand its existing National Security Strategy with a view to ensuring that it is comprehensive and integrated. This process would benefit from involving a wide range of stakeholders in governmental (e.g. ministries of interior, justice, education department/ministry, media/ministry of information, judiciary, etc.) and non-governmental sectors (e.g. the media, civil society, the private sector; faith-based organizations; religious leaders; women's groups; local stakeholders at provincial and/or municipal levels). The new or expanded strategy should also address conditions conducive to terrorism and ensure that all counter-terrorism efforts adhere to Hungary's obligations under international law, including international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law.

***Countering violent extremism conducive to terrorism***

**PRIORITY ACTION RECOMMENDED**

**61. Take steps to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations, in an effort to prevent the indiscriminate targeting of different religions and cultures, fostering tolerance and peaceful coexistence, and creating an environment that is not conducive to incitement. In this regard, it is recommended that public discourse refrain from statements that stigmatize and securitize certain communities, in particular refugees and migrants.**

**62. Strengthen engagement with civil society and ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place to enable CSOs to provide legitimate humanitarian assistance, legal advice, or other support to refugees and migrant communities to carry out their work.**

**63. Ensure that no undue restrictions are placed on civil society's exercise of its freedom of expression and peaceful assembly and association.**

**64. Continue its dialogue with United Nations human rights mechanisms and ensure that all decisions to return asylum-seekers to third States are consistent with the 1951 Refugee Convention. Specifically, the relevant authorities must be satisfied that in any third State the person will not be at risk of persecution, serious harm or refoulement and that the possibility exists to request and receive refugee status in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Convention.**

**65. Maintain an open and constructive dialogue with relevant United Nations human rights mechanisms with a view to ensuring transparency, safeguarding fundamental rights, and promoting trust in the legal framework and criteria used to justify the continued designation of a crisis situation caused by mass immigration**

**66. Ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place to enable CSOs to provide legitimate humanitarian assistance, legal advice, or other support to refugees and migrant communities.**

67. Ensure that all types of racially, religiously or ethnically motivated hatred are actively addressed as an integral part of efforts to prevent violent extremism conducive to terrorism. In this regard, the delegation noted that United Nations human rights bodies have expressed concern about the prevalence of racist hate speech in Hungary against Roma, migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and other minorities.

68. Ensure continued monitoring and appropriate responses to the threat posed by terrorism on the basis of xenophobia, racism and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion and belief, while respecting freedom of expression and association.

69. Take further steps to prevent child and youth radicalization online while safeguarding children's rights.

70. Continue dialogue with the relevant United Nations human rights bodies to address the concerns raised and take further steps to strengthen the independence and effective oversight functions of CFR.

71. Continue its dialogue with United Nations human rights mechanisms to address the concerns raised with regard to civil society's ability to exercise its rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association.

***Role of women and gender in countering terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism***

72. Consider adopting a national action plan on women, peace and security and including provisions related to gender-sensitive approaches to countering terrorism and violent extremism, in line with Security Council resolution 2242 (2015)

## VIII. Areas in which Hungary may benefit from experience of other States

259. The Committee considers that Hungary may benefit from technical assistance and/or advice in the following areas:

1. Technical assistance from UNODC on capacity-building and facilitating the exchange of good practices with other Member States and on addressing the nexus between terrorism and transnational organized crime to enhance its capacity to identify, prevent and disrupt potential links between organized crime and terrorism.

2. Assistance with assessing and addressing TF risks related to virtual assets and VASPs, as well as crowdfunding platforms. Hungary would also benefit from engaging with other jurisdictions that have long-established practices in relation to successfully assessing, regulating, and supervising new and emerging payment services for AML/CFT purposes, including virtual assets and VASPs, as well as crowdfunding platforms. This includes, but is not limited to, analytical tools and technologies that make it possible to trace virtual asset transactions and verify wallet ownership.

3. Assistance in relation to the implementation of revised FATF recommendation 8, including conducting a TF risk assessment for the NPO sector and creating focused, risk-based and proportionate measures to protect it without unduly disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activities.

# Annex I

## A. Composition of visiting delegation

**Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)**

**Head of delegation**
1. Ms. Natalia Gherman, Assistant Secretary-General, Executive Director

**Experts**
2. Mr. Ahmed Essmat Seif El-Dawla Abbas, Section Chief, Europe, Middle East and Central Asia
3. Ms. Nicole El Khoury, Senior Legal Officer
4. Ms. Aleksandra Dier, Legal Officer
5. Ms. Anne-Maria Seesmaa, Legal Officer
6. Ms. Rachel Mourad, Legal Officer
7. Ms. Lisa Letschert, Special Assistant to the Executive Director

**United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism**
8. Ms. Christine Bradley, Chief of the Countering Terrorist Travel Section

**United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime**
9. Mr. Antonio Luzzi, Programme Management Officer

**World Customs Organization**
10. Ms. Mariya Polner, Security Programme Manager, Enforcement and Compliance

**European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation**
11. Ms. Sara Bento, Specialist from the European Counter Terrorism Centre

## B. Composition of host delegation

At the technical level, the delegation engaged in discussions with representatives from several ministries and departments, including the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Interior; the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade; the Ministry of Defence; the Ministry of National Economy; the Ministry of Construction and Transport; the Ministry of Culture and Innovation; the Prosecutor General's Office; the Special Service for National Security; the Military National Security Service; the Counter-Terrorism Centre (TEK); the Office of the Prime Minister; the Department of Civil and Social Relations of the Prime Minister's Office; the Hungarian Central Bank; the National Tax and Customs Administration; the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU); the Standby Police Property Recovery Office; the Airport Police Directorate; Budapest Airport Ltd.; the National Directorate General for Aliens Policing; the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) National Central Bureau (NCB); the Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary; the Police Headquarters of Csongrád-Csanád County; the National Bureau of Investigation of the Standby Police; the National Police Headquarters Criminal Investigation Directorate; the National Information Centre; the International Criminal Cooperation Centre; the Department of Commerce; and the Hungarian Prison Service Headquarters.

## C. Agenda for visit

***Sunday, 15 June 2025***

| Time and venue | Issues to be discussed |
|---|---|
| ***17:00 – 18:30***<br>*Delegation hotel (Novotel Danube)* | Visiting delegation internal coordination meeting |

***Monday, 16 June 2025***

| Time and venue | Issues to be discussed |
|---|---|
| ***9:30 – 11:30*** | **Introduction and counter-terrorism overview**<br><br>• Opening remarks by the host<br>• Opening remarks by the head of the visiting delegation and introduction of its members<br>• Presentation by host on<br>    o Major updates in counter-terrorism system since the 2019 Detailed Implementation Survey and Hungary's 2020 response<br>    o Assessment of the current terrorist threat<br>    o Government's strategic outlook and response to terrorist threat<br>• Q&A<br><br>**Participants**<br>***All visiting delegation members; host's experts and/or advisers from:***<br><br>• *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*<br>• *Counter Terrorism Centre (TEK)*<br>• *National Security Service*<br>• *Ministry of the Interior*<br>• *Ministry of Defence*<br>• *Ministry of Public Administration and Justice*<br>• *National Police*<br>• *Hungarian Financial Intelligence Unit*<br>• *Ministry of Economy and Transport*<br>• *National Tax and Customs Administration*<br>• *The Chief Prosecutor's Office*<br>• *Central Bank of Hungary*<br>• *Border Guard*<br>• *Customs and Finance Guard*<br>• *Migration Service* |

<table>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="2">The visiting delegation also requests that representatives of the following agencies/organizations be invited to join the discussions throughout the visit, as may be necessary:<br><ul><li>Ministry responsible for oversight of religious organizations</li><li>State Secretariat for Public Education</li><li>Ministry of Culture and Innovation</li><li>Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights</li><li>Civil Aviation Authority</li><li>Ministry responsible for youth affairs</li><li>Ministry responsible for women's affairs or gender issues.</li></ul></td></tr>
<tr><td>11:30 – 13:00</td><td colspan="2">Coffee break + Lunch break</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">13:00 – 17:00</td><td>Team A</td><td>Team B</td></tr>
<tr><td>Counter-terrorism legislation, comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies; judicial practice and international cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance<br><ul><li>Implementation of Security Council resolutions and international counter-terrorism instruments (including relevant amendments to national counter-terrorism and criminal legislation)</li><li>Prosecution and adjudication of terrorism-related cases (also with respect to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), terrorist recruitment and incitement to commit terrorist acts): procedures and capacities</li><li>Cooperation between judiciary, prosecution and the police in counter-terrorism cases, including investigation/pretrial stages</li></ul></td><td>Countering violent extremism and radicalization to terrorism<br>Topics for discussion to include:<br><ul><li>Hungary's efforts to implement measures to counter violent extremism, radicalization to terrorism, and terrorist recruitment, including their effectiveness and compliance with international human rights law (challenges, good practices, technical assistance needs, as appropriate)</li><li>Measures to enhance dialogue and broaden understanding among civilizations and to prevent the subversion of educational, cultural, and religious institutions by terrorists, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1624 (2005) counterparts in counter-terrorism cases, including intelligence, investigation, law enforcement and criminal justice</li><li>Preventing terrorists' misuse of information and communications</li></ul></td></tr>
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| | • Evidentiary challenges: use of evidence obtained through special investigative techniques; use of digital evidence; evidence from foreign jurisdictions<br>• Victims and witness protection<br>• International and regional cooperation between the judiciary, prosecution and police and foreign counterparts<br>• Modalities of inter-State cooperation in criminal matters (e.g., transfer of criminal proceedings; extradition law and practice; mutual legal assistance)<br>• Processing of requests for mutual legal assistance and extradition, including capacities of central authority<br>• Related technical assistance needs. | technologies (ICT), including the Internet and social media<br>• Measures and practices developed in relation to counter terrorist narratives (also with reference to Security Council resolution 2354 (2017))<br>• Security Council resolutions 1963 (2010), 2129 (2013) and 2395 (2017) on the development of national comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategies<br>• Role of youth; religious, cultural and education leaders; and concerned civil society groups in countering recruitment<br>• Role of women in countering terrorist radicalization and violent extremism<br>• Security Council requirements in relation to the development of comprehensive and tailored prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration strategies<br>• Measures to prevent radicalization to terrorism and violent extremism in prisons |
| ***17:00 – 18:00*** | ***Team A + Team C*** | |
| | **Visit to the Victim Support Centre** | |

***Tuesday, 17 June 2025***

| **Time and venue** | **Issues to be discussed** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| ***9:00 – 13:00*** | **Team A** | **Team B** | **Team C** |
| | **Countering the financing of terrorism**<br>• Assessment of terrorism-financing | **Law enforcement and border security**<br>• Coordination and exchange of information | **Meeting with representatives of civil society** |

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| | risk; recent trends identified in relation to the financing of terrorism; implementation of risk-based approach<br>• Updates to the criminalization of terrorism-financing offence, including pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014), 2341 (2017) and 2462 (2019)<br>• Terrorism financing investigations and prosecutions (including crowdfunding and other online platforms): trends, updates statistics, new tools and techniques<br>• Operation and effectiveness of financial intelligence unit)<br>• Measures to detect and prevent the use of money service businesses or informal financial networks, cash couriers, and emerging payment methods (e.g., prepaid cards, mobile wallets or virtual assets) for terrorism financing (including in the context of FTFs)<br>• Identifying linkages between transnational organized crime and terrorism threat assessment (including terrorism financing) | between law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved in combating terrorism, including integrated (or access to) databases, and measures aimed at preventing FTF travel and tackling the threat related to returning and relocating FTFs (Security Council resolutions 2178 (2014) and 2396 (2017))<br>• Coordination of law enforcement agencies with other relevant domestic departments (e.g., border and immigration agencies)<br>• Risk management process<br>• Detection, identification, apprehension, and intervention strategies regarding FTFs, including conditions of their return to the country of origin<br>• Use of national watch list or database of known and suspected terrorists, including FTFs; criteria for inclusion, review and removal of names and oversight mechanisms<br>• Procedure for criminal investigations, the use of special investigative techniques, including mechanisms to ensure human rights protections<br>• Law enforcement capacities, including with respect to digital evidence | Meeting with counter-terrorism experts in civil society, academia, think tanks, and/or the private sector in accordance with Security Council resolution 2395 (2017) and 2617 (2021)<br><br>***Participants to include representatives of national civil society organizations*** |

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| | • Recent developments in the implementation of the freezing mechanism; effectiveness of measures to freeze terrorist funds and other assets without delay in accordance with resolution 1373 (2001) (including at the request of other States); applicable safeguards (regular periodic review, possibility of challenging measures; access to funds on humanitarian grounds)<br>• Updates on measures in place to detect and prevent the use of money value transfer services, alternative remittance systems (e.g., hawala) and new payment methods (including virtual assets and crowdfunding platforms, with additional updates on recently introduced regulatory measures) for terrorism financing purposes<br>• Measures to protect non-profit sector from risks associated with terrorism financing and relevant safeguards, as well as to consider and mitigate any unintended impact of measures to counter the financing of terrorism on exclusively humanitarian activity | • Access to regional and international tools, including use and populating of INTERPOL databases through I-24/7 by INTERPOL NCB and access to data of other departments<br>• Preventing terrorist access to weapons (small arms and light weapons, explosives, improvised explosive device (IED) components)<br>• Countering the threat posed by the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for terrorist purposes<br>• International and regional cooperation between law-enforcement agencies and foreign counterparts in counter-terrorism cases (including with respect to FTFs and cross-regional cooperation with States in or neighbouring the conflict zones)<br>• Oversight of counter-terrorism activities of law enforcement bodies<br>• Protection of critical infrastructure pursuant to Security Council resolution 2341 (2017); protection of soft targets pursuant to Security Council resolution 2396 (2017).<br>• Law enforcement efforts in countering the use of ICT for terrorist purposes<br>• Gender aspects | |

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| | • Related technical assistance needs | • Measures taken by the host since 2020 to strengthen its border management, including special measures introduced to stem the flow of FTFs (both departing and returning/relocating), including risk assessments<br>• Inter-agency coordination on border management (including information exchange with law-enforcement agencies and FIU; access to databases; and intelligence threat data)<br>• Access to information at border crossing points, including access to databases, and intelligence threat data<br>• Use and sharing of biometrics in counter-terrorism, including data and privacy protection mechanisms<br>• Use of national, regional and international databases and watch lists at border points (including INTERPOL, etc.)<br>• Implementation of advance passenger information (API) and passenger name records (PNR) systems<br>• Travel-document security – machine readability of travel documents, security processes for the issuances of travel document; including | |

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| | | protection of blank documents<br>• Screening visa applications at consulates<br>• In-country screening measures<br>• Related technical assistance needs<br><br>**Border security (continued):**<br><br>• International cooperation on border control with relevant agencies of other Member States<br>• Measures taken to deny safe haven to terrorists, including abuse of refugee status, in full compliance with international law, including refugee law and human rights standards<br>• Control of cross-border movement of goods and cargo (including implementation of World Customs Organization (WCO) SAFE Framework of Standards (risk assessment methods; customs-to-customs cooperation for inspections; advance information/declaration)<br>• Measures to prevent terrorist access to weapons, IED and UAS components<br>• Information-exchange between customs authorities and other agencies involved in border control and law enforcement | |

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| | | • International and regional cooperation in customs<br>• Gender aspects<br>• Related technical assistance needs | |
| ***13:00 – 14:30*** | **Lunch break** | | |
| ***14:30 – 17:30*** | **Team A** | **Team B** | **Team C** |
| | **Countering the financing of terrorism (continued)** | **Field visit to Budapest Airport**<br><br>The technical on-site visit to Budapest Airport would focus on operational measures to control the cross-border movement of persons, goods and cargo, including documentation (follow-up to the earlier discussion on border management)<br><br>**Aviation security**<br><br>**Venue:** Budapest Airport<br><br>*Topics for discussion to include:*<br>• International legal obligations and regulatory framework (national aviation security/facilitation framework and performance, preventive security measures, cybersecurity)<br>• International legal obligations and regulatory framework (status of Hungary's primary aviation security and facilitation legislative framework | **Meeting with the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights of Hungary** |

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| | | and related policies and programmes)<br>• Hungary's Civil Aviation Authority oversight capability (responsibilities, powers, resources, quality control activities, resolution of security concerns, training, and certification requirements)<br>• Inter-agency coordination and cooperation, including mechanisms on national and airport levels<br>• Aviation risk management framework<br>• Aspects of international cooperation related to aviation security<br>• Aspects of civil aviation cybersecurity framework<br>• Protection of critical infrastructure and soft targets<br>• UAS regulation and preventive measures | |

***Wednesday, 18 June 2025***

| **Time and venue** | **Meetings, themes and requested participants** | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Team B** | **Team A** |
| ***9:00 – 14:00*** | **Field visit to Röszke border crossing point**<br><br>The technical on-site visit to the border-crossing point would focus on operational measures to control the cross-border movement of persons, | Preparation of preliminary observations by visiting delegation<br><br>Discussion and consolidation of initial findings from the assessment visit among the members of the delegation |

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| | goods and cargo, including documentation<br><br>**Border security**<br><br>*Topics for discussion to include:*<br><br>• Inter-agency coordination and cooperation, including customs, immigration, security<br>• Operationalization of the integrated border management strategy<br>• Passenger Information Unit and implementation of API and PNR (national level)<br>• Practical/operational measures to prevent and detect the use of cash couriers for the purposes of terrorism financing<br>• Border point coordination between agencies involved in counter-terrorism and countering organized crime<br>• Access to information at border-crossing points, including access to relevant national and international databases<br>• Use of biometric data<br>• Travel document security verification<br>• International cooperation on border control with relevant agencies<br>• Control of cross-border movement of goods and cargo (including implementation of WCO SAFE Framework of Standards (risk assessment methods; customs-to-customs cooperation for inspections; advance information/declaration) | |

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| | • Measures to detect to weapons, IED and UAS components<br>• Information-exchange between customs authorities and other agencies involved in border control and law enforcement | |
| ***15:00 – 16:30*** | **Presentation to Hungary of the main outcomes of the follow-up visit** | |
| | *Participants: all members of the visiting and host delegation* | |